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Corporationsas Plaintiffs Under InternationalLaw

Corporations as Plaintiffs
Under International Law:
Three Narratives about
Investment Treaties
Charles H. Brower, II*

I. Introduction
When talking about corporations as defendants under international law, the narrative
and the legal framework seem clear even if the outcome does not. According to the narrative, multinational corporations involved in extractive industries collaborate with repressive governments to terrorize populations, instituting forced labor, attacking those who
resist, and spoiling the environment in ways that destroy traditional cultures and, perhaps,
the conditions that support human life.' Relying on the Alien Tort Statute,2 victims invoke
the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts to pursue remedies for state-sponsored injuries
*

1.

2.

Visiting Professor, American University, Washington College of Law; Croft Professor of International
Law and Jessie D.Puckett, Jr., Lecturer-in-Law, University of Mississippi School of Law.
See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving allegations that an
international mining corporation operated an enormous copper and gold mine in ways that severely
polluted the environment in Papua New Guinea, subjected workers to "slave-like" conditions, and solicited the government to use force against those who sought to disrupt the mining project); Doe I v.
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936, 939-40, 942 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.
2005) (involving allegations that an international oil and gas company aided and abetted the government of Myanmar in displacing rural villagers from a pipeline route, forcing them to work as porters for the project, executing those who refused to participate, and subjecting forced workers to
rape); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2000) (involving allegations
that an international oil corporation coercively appropriated land from indigenous people, substantially polluted their homeland, and recruited Nigerian security forces to suppress local opposition by
armed force and torture). See also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244, 247, 249-51, 256 (9th Cir. 2009) (involving claims that a Canadian oil corporation aided and abetted the Sudanese government in executing security measures designed to displace indigenous
people through military operations launched from the supply roads and airfields associated with oil
facilities).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). In its decisions, the Supreme Court has consistently referred to this provision
as the "Alien Tort Statute." See Samantar v. Yousuf, --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010); Sosa v. Al-

varez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472 (2004); Argentine Rep. v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 432 (1989). While many lower courts describe it as the
"Alien Tort Claims Act," the author avoids that label because it may express a normative (and controversial) assessment regarding the statute's role in promoting international human rights litigation.
See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2008); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763,
770 (7th Cir. 2008); Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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committed abroad against aliens, often by foreign corporations. 3 Although the results may
vary from case to case, 4 the storyline and the analytical template encompass familiar terrain.5 In other words, one at least knows how to begin and to proceed with a discussion of
corporations as defendants under international law.
For discussions of corporations as plaintiffs under international law, only the point of
departure seems clear: Investment treaties represent the prominent gateway into an international legal process that affords corporations wide opportunities to assert rights and
to seek remedies for sovereign acts harmful to their investments in foreign states. 6 Having
recognized the potential significance of investment treaties, however, one struggles to find
an appropriate narrative to explain their function and, thus, to guide their application in
3.

4.

5.

6.

See generally Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 247, 249-51; Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1197-98; Unocal, 395 F.3d
at 936,939-40, 942; Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 91-93. See also Ingrid Wuerth, Wiwa v. Shell: The $15.5 Million
Settlement, ASIL INSIGHT (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.asil.org/files/insight090909pdf.pdf (emphasizing that Alien Tort Statute cases "commit substantial judicial resources to resolving difficult legal issues in cases where the conduct generally occurs abroad, largely or solely between foreigners").
See Wuerth, supra note 3 (concluding that Alien Tort Statute claims remain "uncertain to litigate").
Compare Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (declining to recognize claims for cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as actionable under the Alien Tort Statute),
with Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1092-95 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (recognizing a cause of
action under the Alien Tort Statute for specific conduct universally condemned as cruel, inhuman or
degrading).
In addition to disagreements regarding the scope of conduct covered by the Alien Tort Statute,
particular claims may fail for a variety of context-specific reasons, including preemption by other federal statutes or, simply, a lack of evidence. For example, in Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1086-88, the
court held that the Death on the High Seas Act preempts application of the Alien Tort Statute to claims
for summary execution on offshore oil platforms. In Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 247-48, 262-64,
the court dismissed the claim for lack of evidence that the defendant oil company intended to harm
civilians in southern Sudan.
While outright victories against multinational enterprises seem relatively uncommon under the
Alien Tort Statute, claimants have received meaningful settlements in particular cases. For example,
in 2004, Unocal settled claims relating to the construction of a pipeline in Myanmar. John Crook, Tentative Settlement ofATCA Human Rights Suits Against Unocal, 99 AM. J.INT'L L.497, 497 (2005). While
the precise terms of the settlement remain confidential, it included compensation for the plaintiffs
and funds to "develop programs to improve living conditions, health care and education and protect
the rights of people in the pipeline region." Id at 498 (quoting Press Release, Unocal, Settlement
Reached in Human Rights Lawsuit (Dec. 13, 2004)). More recently, in 2009, Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company and Shell Transport concluded a $15.5 million settlement with members of the Ogoni
people in Nigeria. Wuerth, supra note 3, at 102.
In addition to settlements and judgments, one can hardly discount the value to claimants (and the
cost to defendants) of publicity generated by claims under the Alien Tort Statute. Cf id. (speculating
that the prospect of negative publicity may have encouraged Royal Dutch and Shell Transport to settle on the eve of trial).
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-28 (accepting that the Alien Tort Statute provides a cause of action for certain violations of international law, but urging "great caution" in recognizing new causes of action,
and authorizing such recognition only for norms "accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to" the 18th-century prohibition of piracy). See also Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d
at 255-56 (applying the framework articulated in Sosa); Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d
733, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Vietnam Assoc. for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517
F.3d 104, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2008) (same); Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (same).
See leswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State
Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 138,143-44 (2007) (discussing the recent growth of investment treaty arbitration, and emphasizing the unique and powerful character of an international legal
process that allows private parties to bring highly politicized, big-dollar claims against host states).
See also Karl P. Sauvant, Introduction to 1 Y.B. INT'L INVESTMENT L. & POL'Y xxi, xxI (2009) (indicating
that the number of claims brought under investment treaties "has risen rapidly and reached 300 by
mid-2008, with more than half of the disputes arising during the past five years").
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concrete situations.
Moving beyond analogies to international commercial arbitration,7 inter-state arbitration,8 and the law of sovereign immunity (which tend to emphasize procedural issues), 9
one finds at least three narratives that promise to explain the functions of investment treaties. First, drawing on domestic jurisprudence, one might regard investment treaties as
elaborate choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses designed to promote certainty in international business.10 Second, drawing on scholarship, one might describe investment
treaties as the functional equivalent of human rights treaties designed to protect foreign
investors from serious abuse by host states." Third, drawing on journalism, commentary,
and the campaigns of advocacy groups, one might finally portray investment treaties as
dangerous tools that empower foreign corporations to avoid (or to neutralize the economic
consequences of) regulation. 12 While plausible up to a point, each comparison requires a
level of exaggeration that becomes impossible to maintain. However, by pushing each
comparison to the point of failure, one reveals a different and comparatively modest narrative about the proper role of investment treaties.

II. The Business Planning Narrative
In seeking a narrative to explain the function of investment treaties, one often feels
drawn towards the Supreme Court's famous trio of decisions on the enforcement of forumselection clauses and arbitration agreements. Decided between 1972 and 1985, these cases
not only address the enforcement of dispute-settlement clauses; as explained below, they
also describe the role that such provisions play in facilitating international commerce.
Until the middle of the twentieth century, United States courts operated in an environment that treated forum-selection clauses with suspicion.13 Regarding them as devices to
circumvent the normal judicial process, 14 Courts routinely described such clauses as "void"
or "contrary to public policy."s Although some lower courts began to manifest greater acceptance of "reasonable" forum-selection clauses by the late 1940's, the tide definitively
turned in 1972, when the Supreme Court's decision in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
7.

See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II,Beware theJabberwock:A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L
L. 465, 471-76 (2002) [hereinafter Beware the Jabberwock] (arguing that investment treaty awards
fall within the legal framework applied to international commercial arbitration); Charles H. Brower,
II,Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The EmpireStrikes Back, 40 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L.43,62-74
(2001) [hereinafter Empire Strikes Back] (same).

8.
9.

See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, The Functions and Limits of Arbitration and judicial Settlement Under
Private and Public InternationalLaw, 18 DUKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 298-308 (2008) (discussing investment treaty disputes in light of the historical evolution of inter-state arbitration).
See generally Charles H.Brower, 11,Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration,and the Law of State Immunity, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 907, 911-25 (2005) (identifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as a

context in which judges have administered large numbers of cases involving commercial disputes
11.

with foreign states and exploring the lessons to be drawn for investor-state arbitration).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part Ill.

12.

See infra Part IV.

13.

GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 438-39
(4th ed. 2007).
Id. at 439-40, 454.
Id. at 439 (quoting Benson v. E. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 174 N.Y. 83, 86 (1903) and Carbon Black Export,
Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1958)).

10.

14.
15.
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enforced an agreement between German and U.S. companies to litigate in England disputes
arising out of a contract to tow an oil-drilling rig from the Gulf of Mexico to a location in the
Adriatic Sea. 16 According to the Court, judicial hostility towards such agreements threatened to retard the growth of international commerce by reinforcing the uncertainty costs
associated with exposure to litigation in multiple venues, as well as the risk of litigation in
a hostile or inexperienced forum.17 By contrast, enforcement of freely negotiated forumselection clauses promotes international commerce by allowing the parties to designate in
advance a single forum possessing appropriate characteristics (such as neutrality and expertise), thus bringing "vital certainty" to the resolution of contingent risks.18
Two years later, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Supreme Court ordered a U.S. company to arbitrate a securities fraud claim against a German individual under the arbitration
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.19 In addition to recognizing the
arbitrability of securities fraud claims for "truly international" agreements, 20 the decision
extended The Bremen in two ways. First, it described arbitration agreements as specialized
forum-selection clauses, 21 thus subjecting their enforcement to the legal framework articulated in The Bremen. Second, because the relevant clause in Scherk contained an express
choice of law (unlike The Bremen),22 the Court took the opportunity to discuss the combined effect of forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses in promoting international
trade.23 Thus, the Court described a "contractual provision specifying in advance the forum
in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied" as an "almost indispensible
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction."24
In 1985, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., which addressed the arbitrability of antitrust claims for international transactions. 25 In addition to invoking comity to foreign tribunals as an additional
reason for the enforcement of arbitration agreements even in the antitrust context, 26 the
decision also remains noteworthy for emphasizing the weight that the Court assigned to
the role of dispute-settlement clauses in promoting certainty for international commerce.
During the decades before Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court had consistently emphasized the
fundamental importance of antitrust laws to American capitalism. For example, in 1933,
Chief Justice Hughes described the Sherman Antitrust Act as a "charter of freedom" that
might be compared to a constitutional provision. 27 Nearly four decades later, the Court referred to the Sherman Act as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise[, which is] as important to
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1-2, 15 (1972).
Id. at 9, 11-14, 17-18.
Id. at 11-14, 17-18.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508-09, 519-20 (1974).
Id. at 515-16.
Id. at 519.
Compare id. at 508 (quoting the parties' arbitration and choice-of-law clauses), with Bremen, 407 U.S.
at 13 n.15 (observing that the contract did not contain an express choice-of-law clause).
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17.
Id. at 516.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616 (1985).
Id. at 629.
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
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the preservation of economic freedom as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." 28 Under these circumstances, federal courts of appeals had
uniformly treated antitrust claims as public matters not capable of settlement by arbitration. 29
While recognizing the "fundamental importance" of antitrust laws,3 0 however, the Court
concluded in Mitsubishi that the need for predictability in international commerce justified
the arbitrability of antitrust disputes, "even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context."31 In other words, the Court regarded the need for certainty in international commerce as so compelling that the Court pursued it even at the expense of fundamental national policies.
In one sense, The Bremen, Scherk, and Mitsubishi provide little help in understanding the
function of investment treaties. In the narrowest sense, those cases deal with the enforceability of dispute-settlement clauses, which seems above question in the context of investment treaties.3 2 Drawing broader lessons, however, the cases suggest that (1) arbitration
agreements and choice-of-law clauses promote certainty, (2) certainty fuels international
commerce, and (3) adjudicators should apply dispute-settlement provisions in a manner
that nourishes predictability for international transactions even at the expense of other
important values.
Building on the points just made, one might pause to observe that investment treaties
represent elaborate dispute-settlement clauses insofar as they (1) identify standards for
the treatment of foreign investment, and (2) establish procedures for the arbitration of
claims brought directly by foreign investors their against host states.33 Viewed from this
perspective, the Supreme Court's narrative arguably becomes relevant by analogy: Investment treaties serve to facilitate international commerce by enhancing predictability for
cross-border investment transactions. Adopting that as the frame of reference for treaty
interpretation, tribunals should apply investment treaties in ways that increase certainty
for foreign investors, even at the expense of values that might prevail in the domestic context.
In some academic circles, the business planning narrative has gained credence as a tool

United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 634-35 (majority opinion).
Id. at 629, 630-31.
According to certain authorities, the procedural right of direct access to international arbitration
against host states represents the "main objective" or the "real innovation" of investment treaties. See
Ceskoslovenski Obchodni Banka A.S. v. Slovk., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on jurisdiction, 11
57 (May 24, 1999), 1999 WL 33944062 [hereinafter CSOB Decision on jurisdiction]; Susan D.Franck,
IntegratingInvestment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L.REV. 161, 172 (2007).
33. Many writers emphasize the common structure of investment treaties, which almost invariably (1)
prescribe substantive standards of treatment with respect to foreign investment, and (2) establish
procedures for the resolution of disputes through investor-state arbitration. See, e.g., JULIAN D.M. LEW
ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 768 (2003); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS
PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 65 (2009); Brower, supra note 8, at 299-301;
Charles H. Brower, 11,Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a PartialAmendment of NAFTA
Article 1105, 46 VA. I. INT'L L. 347, 349-50 (2006) [hereinafter FTC Notes]; Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Privatizing Public InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions,73 FORDHAM L.REV. 1521, 1529 (2005).

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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for describing the function of investment treaties. For example, at a conference in January
2007, the author made a presentation regarding the sources of decentralization and, therefore, inconsistency in investment treaty arbitration.34 These included decades of controversy about the standards of treatment for foreign investment, the existence of thousands
of bilateral treaties as opposed to a single global instrument (or even a handful of comprehensive regional instruments), and recourse to a series of ad hoc tribunals as opposed to a
single, permanent tribunal.35 Concluding his presentation, the author described human
rights as another decentralized international legal regime, observed that people have come
to expect a degree of inconsistency among the jurisprudence of global and regional human
rights systems, and suggested that users of investment treaties could tolerate a similar divergence of outcomes. 36 During the ensuing discussion, a well-known academic with a
transactional background opined that the commercial setting of foreign investment requires a higher level of consistency than might be tolerated in the protection of human
rights.
Turning from academic discourse to the decisions of tribunals, one finds at least two
lines of cases that seem to regard the enhancement of predictability as a touchstone for
applying investment treaties. For example, many tribunals have emphasized protection
37
and promotion of foreign investment as the fundamental purpose of investment treaties.
While unremarkable in the abstract, this insight has led many tribunals to prefer treaty interpretations that resolve "uncertainties" in favor of protecting covered investments.38 As a
34. An extended version of the remarks later appeared as a book chapter. See Charles H. Brower, 11,Reflections on the Road Ahead: Living with Decentralization in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE
FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 339 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009).
35.

Id. at 341-47.

36. Id. at 353-54.
37. See Cont'l. Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on jurisdiction, 1 80 (Feb. 22, 2006),

2006 WL 462065; Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on jurisdiction,
247 (Oct. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 3619910; Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrg., SCC Arbritration No. 126/2003,
Award, T 98 (Mar. 29, 2005); Siemens A.G. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on jurisdiction,
T 81 (Aug. 3, 2004), 2004 WL 3249805; MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7,
Award, TT 104, 113 (May 25, 2004), 2004 WL 3254551 [hereinafter MTD Award]; Tokios Tokelds v.
Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 31 (Apr. 29, 2004), 2004 WL 3392064;
Soci6t6 G~ndrale de Surveillance v. Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on jurisdiction, 116
(Jan. 29, 2004), 2004 WL 3254664 [hereinafter SGS Decision on jurisdiction];CSOB Decision onjurisdiction, supra note 32, 1 57, 64; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 114. But see Saluka Inv. BV
v. Czech, Partial Award, 300 (Mar. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-210-2006.pdf [hereinafter Saluka
Partial Award] (emphasizing that the "protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the
[t]reaty").

38. See, e.g., SGS Decision on jurisdiction, supra note 37, 116 (emphasizing the fundamental purpose of
the relevant BIT as promotion and protection of investments, and concluding that "[i]t is legitimate to
resolve uncertainties ... so as to favour the protection of covered investments"); RUDOLF DOLZER &
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 32 (2008) ("Tribunals have frequently interpreted investment treaties in light of their object and purpose, often by looking at their
preambles. Typically, this has led to an interpretation that is favorable to the investor."). See also
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 115-16 (observing that some tribunals have adopted a teleological approach that favors the protection of investors and investments, and concluding that "proinvestor interpretations on the basis of the object and purpose of [investment treaties] would seem to
be defensible readings"); Jason Webb Yackee, Are BITs Such a Bright Idea? Exploring the Ideational
Basis of Investment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAVIS J.INT'L L.& POL'Y 195, 221 n.120 (2005) (opining
that "arbitral tribunals have so far not been overly stingy in interpreting ... ambiguities in favor of
foreign investors").
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result, some observers regard their decisions as reflecting a systematic predisposition towards the commercial interests of foreign investors as opposed to the regulatory interests
of host states.3 9 While such predispositions may not give foreign investors the reassurance
that any particular rule will govern their disputes with host states, they guarantee that the
interests of foreign investors will receive an edge over the competing interests of host
states in cases of doubt. In effect, this mirrors the Supreme Court's business planning narrative by applying the terms of dispute-settlement agreements with a bias towards the enhancement of commercial certainty, even at the expense of competing values that might
prevail in a domestic context.
Moving from general inclinations to the application of specific treaty provisions, many
tribunals have expressed a profound concern for establishing conditions often associated
with certainty. For example, while subject to important variations in wording, virtually all
investment treaties include a clause extending "fair and equitable treatment" to covered
investments. 40 While perhaps not implied by the ordinary language, several tribunals have
construed this phrase to require that host states meet the "legitimate expectations" of foreign investors, 41 including some demanding assumptions about the requirements of consistency,42 transparency, 43 and stability in public affairs. 44 Thus, according to one popular
39.

See Noble Ventures v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, 52 (Oct 12, 2005) [hereinafter
Noble Ventures Award], 2005 WL 3067740 (complaining that investment treaty tribunals "too often"
interpret BITs "exclusively in favour of investors"); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
AND PUBLIC LAW 121 (2007) (describing a "general tendency" of tribunals to "read the object and pur-

pose of investment treaties in ways that emphasize the interests of investors over competing governmental priorities"); Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to
the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 345, 350 (2007) (suggesting that "more often than not, ICSID
tribunals are preoccupied with the commercial interests of foreign investors").
40. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 489 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER]; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 119; CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL.,
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 493 (2008); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 556
(2d ed. 2008); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 255; NOAH RUBINs & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 212 (2005).
41. See Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 330 (Aug. 14, 2007),
2007 WL 5366481 [hereinafter ParkeringsAward]; Saluka PartialAward, supra note 37, 7 302; Int'l
147-48 (Jan. 26, 2006), available at
Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, Award, T
Tcnicas Medioamhttp://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-136-2006.pdf;
bientales, TECMED S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, T 154 (May 29, 2003), 2003
WL 24038436 [hereinafter Tecmed Award]; CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 235-36 (2007); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 279.
42. See, e.g., MTD Award, supra note 37, 165 (declaring that the host state had an "obligation to act coherently and to apply its laws consistently").
43. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 76 (Aug. 30, 2000), 2000
WL 34514285 [hereinafter MetalcladAward] (concluding that "fair and equitable treatment" includes
a strong obligation of transparency that leaves "no room" for "doubt," "uncertainty," "misunderstanding," or "confusion" regarding the host state's legal requirements that apply to foreign investment).
44. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 274 (May 12, 2005),
2005 WL 1201002 [hereinafter CMS Award] (declaring that "[tihere can be no doubt ... that a stable
legal and business environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment").
Responding to some of the more onerous formulations of host states' obligations with respect to
consistency, transparency and stability, certain observers have criticized the investment treaty jurisprudence as unrealistic and unsupported as a matter of international law. See MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v.
Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment, 7T 66-67 (Feb. 16, 2007), 2007 WL
1215071 (expressing appreciation for the view that " 'the Tec[mjed programme for good governance'
is extreme and does not reflect international law"); Zachary Douglas, Nothing if Not Criticalfor Investment Treaty Arbitration:Occidental, Eureko and Methanex, 22 ARB. INT'L 27, 28 (2006) (referring
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formulation, host states must "act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity, and totally
transparently in [their] relations with . . . foreign investor[s]." 45 In the words of another
tribunal, "the fair end equitable treatment standard consists of the host State's consistent
and transparent behavior, free of ambiguity, that involves the obligation to grantand main-

tain a stable and predictable legal framework necessary to fulfill the justified expectations
of the foreign investor."46
Paraphrasing the awards just mentioned, host states must establish clear legal rules governing foreign investment, apply them consistently, and refrain from altering the basic
legal and business framework governing foreign investment. While these obligations do
not require host states to guarantee the success of foreign investments, 47 or even to create
the most favorable conditions for foreign investments, 48 they demand something like certainty in the sense that legal requirements (however good or bad) must be stated clearly
and protected from substantial variation in principle and in practice. Thus, mirroring the
Supreme Court's narrative, businesses should have the opportunity to identify their rights
with clarity before committing resources to cross-border transactions. Thereafter, competing social policies will rarely justify the disturbance of settled expectations.
Viewed from one perspective, it seems natural for the application of investment treaties

45.

46.
47.

to the Tecmed standard as "a description of perfect public regulation in a perfect world, to which all
states should aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain"); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities, 101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 3, 41 (2007) (observing that
some tribunals "have interpreted 'Fair and Equitable treatment' to entail extraordinarily high ... levels of obligations for developing countries to provide ... transparency, competency, responsiveness,
and efficiency").
Tecmed Award, supra note 41, 1 154 (emphasis added). This formulation does not represent an outlier, but a common point of departure for awards on the topic of fair and equitable treatment See
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 127 (Oct. 3, 2006), 2006
WL 2985837 [hereinafter LG&E Decision on Liability]; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Tecaret Ve Snayi A.S. v.
Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on jurisdiction, 11 237-41 (Nov. 14, 2005), 2005 WL
3598900; CMS Award, supra note 44, Ty 279-81; Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, London CL Int'l Arb. Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, Ty 185-87 (July 1, 2004), available at
http://ita.aw.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward_001.pdf; MTD Award, supra note 37, TT
114-15. See also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 127 (observing that the Tecmed formulation
"has become famous for its often-cited wide-ranging paragraph 154 in which it defined the [fair and
equitable treatment] standard"); Douglas, supra note 44, at 28 (opining that the Tecmed standard "is
now frequently cited by tribunals as the only and therefore definitive authority for the requirements
of fair and equitable treatment"); W. Michael Reisman, The Evolving InternationalStandard and Sovereignty, 101 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.PROC. 462,463-64 (2007) (observing that the relevant passage from the
Tecmed Award "has been recited by many other [t]ribunals").
LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 45, 7 131 (emphasis added).
See MTD Award, supra note 37, T 178 (recalling that "BITs are not an insurance against business
risk"); Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, T 64 (Nov. 13, 2000), 2000 WL 34513944

48.

(emphasizing that "Bilateral Investment Treaties are not insurance policies against bad business
judgments"); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 298 (concluding that investment treaties "do
not provide blanket insurance against all forms of business risk").
See LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 45, 130 (observing that "the investor's fair expectations"
must be "based on the conditions offered by the host State at the time of the investment"); NEWCOMBE
& PARADELL, supra note 33, at 296 ("Fair and equitable treatment does not require that governments
adopt specific types of economic policies. It does not require host states to liberalize, privatize, deregulate, lower taxes or engage in other economic policies that might be viewed as creating favourable
conditions for private investment"). Of course, the situation changes for cases in which the host state
makes specific and direct promises to particular investors about anticipated regulatory reforms designed to establish more favorable conditions for foreign investments. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra
note 33, at 296.
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to track or even extend the Supreme Court's business planning narrative. Assuming that
international commerce demands predictability in general, 49 the need for that element
reaches its height in the context of investment transactions.50 As explained by Professors
Dolzer and Schreuer:
[Wihereas a trade deal typically consists in a one-time exchange of goods and money, the decision to
invest in a foreign country initiates a long-term relationship between the investor and the host country. Often, the business plan of the investor is to sink substantial resources into the project at the
outset of the investment, with the expectation to recoup this amount plus an acceptable rate of return during the subsequent period of investment, sometimes running up to 30 years or more.
A key feature in the design of such a foreign investment is to lay out in advance the risks inherent in
such a long-term relationship, both from a business perspective and from the legal point of view, and
then to identify a business concept and a legal structure that is suitable not only to the implementation of the project in general but also to minimize the risks that may arise during the period of investment....

The central political risk that arises for the foreign investor lies in a change of the position of the
host government that would alter the scheme of burdens, risks, and benefits, which the two sides
have laid down when they negotiated the deal and which formed the basis of the investor's plan and
the legitimate expectations embodied in this plan. Such a change of position on the part of the host
country becomes more likely with every subsequent change of government in the host state during
the period of investment.51
In other words, given the larger commitment of resources, the longer time periods, and
the pressures for host states to revisit the balance between investment and other priori-

ties, the application of investment treaties in good faith requires, if anything, an even
52
greater emphasis on certainty and even more protection from competing social policies.
Viewed from another perspective, however, it seems absurd for the application of investment treaties to track (much less extend) the Supreme Court's business planning narrative. The Bremen, Scherk and Mitsubishi each involved the application of commercial
agreements between private parties, who negotiated specific provisions aimed at bringing
clarity to the resolution of disputes. Under these circumstances, the Court sensibly granted
the parties the full measure of their bargains on the modalities for dispute-settlement not-

See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (indicating that "orderliness and predictability" are "essential to any international business transaction"); Fernando R. Thson, The Kantian
Theory of InternationalLaw, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 77 (1992) (observing that "international business
transactions require stability and predictability to be successful").
50. See Rudolf Dolzer, Fairand Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 INT'L LAW.
87, 104 (2005) (explaining that stability and predictability of legal requirements represent issues of
fundamental importance to foreign investors who commit significant capital resources to their host
states for a period of years or decades).

49.

51.

52.

DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 3-4. See also LEW ET AL., supra note 33, at 762 (explaining that

investments "may be considerable" and "may need years for the investor to recover").
See leswald W. Salacuse, The Treatificationof InternationalInvestment Law, 13 L.&Bus. REV. AM. 155,
156 (2007) (describing investment treaties as tools that enable foreign investors to "resist the forces
of change often demanded by the political and economic life in host countries"). Thus, as tribunals
have observed, investment treaties are specifically designed to protect foreign investors during times
of "economic difficulty and hardship," when political support for the imposition of harsh measures
may reach a highpoint in the host state. See Sempra Energy Int'l v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award, 373 (Sept 28, 2007), 2007 WL 5540331; Enron Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award, 331 (May 22, 2007), 2007 WL 5366471.
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withstanding peripheral effects on enforcement of public regulatory laws.
One may, of course, identify situations in which foreign investors have commercial relationships, such as procurement contracts, with host states.53 In those cases, large-scale foreign investors bargain directly with their host states regarding the precise allocation of
"burdens, risks, and benefits." 54 To guide the application of such agreements directly or
through an investment treaty's umbrella clause,5 one might adopt the Supreme Court's
business planning narrative by analogy, subject to the adjustments required to account for
the host state's dual role as commercial partner and regulator.
However, the relationships between foreign investors and host states often do not involve any commercial transactions. 56 For example, when a U.S. investor acquired a project
to build a hazardous waste facility near a rural Mexican town,57 it made an investment on
Mexican territory, but did not thereby establish a commercial relationship with the host
state.5 As a result, it did not bargain with the host state regarding the allocation of substantive obligations or the modalities for dispute settlement. Under these circumstances, the
Supreme Court's business planning narrative loses relevance because it aims to facilitate
the performance of bargains that simply do not exist.
Even in the absence of directly negotiated commercial arrangements, however, investment treaties provide a framework to guarantee that relationships between foreign investors and host states do not occur within a legal vacuum.59 Thus, mirroring the form of
53. See Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, TV 81-97 (Feb. 6. 2007), 2007 WL
1215068 [hereinafter Siemens Award] (describing the investor's agreement to provide the host state
with national identification cards and related services); SGS Decision on jurisdiction,supra note 37, Ty
12-25 (discussing the investor's agreement to provide pre-shipment customs inspection services for
the host state).
54. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 4.
55. Appearing in a minority of investment treaties, so-called "umbrella clauses" arguably (though controversially) empower investors to bring treaty claims for what would otherwise constitute mere contractual disputes. See SGS Decision onjurisdiction,supra note 37, T 128; R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTEs 1008 (2005); DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 153-62; DUGAN ET AL., supra
note 40, at 451; McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 92, 111, 115-17; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
40, at 506-08; RUBINS &KINSELLA, supra note 40, at 234-40.
56. See RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 40, at 42 (observing that "not all investment activity involves a
State contract ... and ... foreign businesses will not always have enough influence to enter into a special contractual arrangement").
28-44 (describing the relevant transaction).
57. See Metalclad Award, supra note 43,
58. See J.C.Thomas, A Reply to ProfessorBrower, 40 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 433, 442 (2002) ("Metalclad
had invested in Mexico, not with Mexico, and no commercial relationship in the sense of a contract existed between them."). Mr. Thomas represented Mexico in the dispute with Metalclad. Id. at 433 n.1.
59. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 22 (explaining that "the purpose of investment treaties is to
address the typical risks of a long-term investment project, and thereby to provide for stability and
predictability in the sense of an investment-friendly climate").
Although there was a time when customary international law supplied the necessary background
rules, the combined forces of decolonization and socialist revolution sought to dethrone those norms
during the 1960's and 1970's. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 14-15; LOWENFELD, supra note
40, at 469, 483-94; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 18-19, 26-27, 31-33; RUBINS & KINSELLA,
supra note 40, at 155-58, 160-66; Salacuse, supra note 52, at 155.
To counteract the resulting uncertainties, capital exporting states developed investment treaties
as a tool for establishing a relatively clear and robust set of background rules to govern relations between foreign investors and host states. Id at 156 (recalling the efforts of capital exporting states to
reinvigorate the protection of foreign investment by negotiating treaties that would be "1) complete,
2) clear and specific, 3) unconestable, and 4) enforceable"). See also MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 41,
at 17-18 (emphasizing that states "have entered into investment treaties precisely in order to reme-
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commercial agreements, investment treaties establish the substantive obligations of host
states with respect to the treatment of foreign investment, and give foreign investors the
right to submit claims for alleged treaty violations directly to arbitration before international tribunals. 60 Given their superficial resemblance, one understands the temptation to
use commercial agreements as a basis for understanding the function of investment treaties.61
However, one must take care not to exaggerate the similarities between commercial
agreements and investment treaties, which pale in the face of substantial differences. 62 For
example, while private parties negotiate and perform commercial agreements, they do not
participate in the negotiation of investment treaties and, thus, do not become parties to investment treaties. 63 To the contrary, states (and only states) negotiate and become parties
to investment treaties. 64 Also, while states have an interest in promoting foreign investment to fuel economic development, 65 they also have an interest in pursuing (and may
have obligations under international law to pursue) other values, including protection of
dy perceived gaps or limitations in the protections afforded by customary international law");

60.
61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 41 (opining that the "development of [investment treaties]
was primarily a response to the uncertainties ... of the customary international law of state responsibility to aliens").
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See David R. Haigh, Chapter 11-Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 115, 128 (2000) (stating, in the context of NAFTA's investment chapter, that the "fundamental objective ... is to create a bargain between host states and
investors," according to which "those who respond to the invitation from the host country to invest
their expertise and other resources in that state may be assured that ... basic standards of fairness
will be fully observed by the host government").
See Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, T 233 (June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M.
811 (2003) [hereinafter Loewen Award] (warning that "there is no warrant for transferring rules derived from private law into a field of international [investment] law"); Salacuse, supra note 6, at 140
(emphasizing that investment treaty disputes "are not a matter of simple contract claims governed by
contract law[; t]hey are disputes governed by public international law in the form of treatiesinstruments of international law-solemnly entered into by two or more states").
It goes without saying, however, that government agencies often consult with business interests in
the development of model investment treaties. See Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3, 7 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008) (expressing no
doubt that multinational enterprises "lobby governments and intergovernmental organizations to ensure that normative development is business friendly"); Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global
Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 439 (2010) (observing that capital-exporting states
have adopted model investment treaties "after significant consultation with domestic interest
groups").
See Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investment Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?,12 U.C. DAVIS J.INT'L L.& POL'Y 47, 73 (2005) ("Unlike private commercial law contracts, treaties involve rights negotiated and granted between two sovereigns."). One should also bear in mind the position trenchantly taken by some states (and accepted
by certain tribunals) that the substantive obligations created by investment treaties are and remain
undertakings solely between or among states. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Mex., ICSID Case No.
at
available
21,
2007),
(Nov.
168-80
Award,
ARB(AF)/04/05,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docid=
DC782_En&caseld=C43 [hereinafter ADM Award].
See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. v. Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award on Jurisdiction, 23 (Sept 25,
1983), 23 I.L.M. 351 (1984) ("To protect investment is to protect the general interest of development
and of developing countries."); Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration,
http://www.transnational-dispute2004,
Feb.
MGMT,
DisP.
TRANSNAT'L
management.com/samples/freearticles/tvl-1-article_56.htm ("I start from the proposition that there
is an overriding public interest in effective foreign investment protection.").
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the environment, public health, human rights and labor rights. 66 As a result, when concluding investment treaties, states often seek to advance the interests of several different constituencies. 67 Consequently, investment treaties may not address all topics of importance
to foreign investors. 68 Furthermore, to the extent that they address such topics, they may
not adopt the preferred solutions of foreign investors.6 9 Finally, given the need to reach
agreement while finessing the differences among various stakeholders, investment treaties
often do not reflect the specificity of commercial agreements, but formulate the obligations
of host states at a high degree of generality. 70 Under these circumstances, maximization of
66. See Charles H.Brower, 11,Obstacles and Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in Investment
Treaty Disputes, 1 Y.B. INT'L INv. L. & Pot'Y 347, 374-75 (2009).
67. See Kenneth J.Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL
INT'L L.]. 201, 210 (1988) (explaining the need for, and difficulties involved in, using inter-agency
processes for the development of model investment treaties). To the extent that states shift the focus
of investment promotion and protection from stand-alone investment treaties to free trade agreements that include investment chapters, they must accommodate a correspondingly wider range of
interests into the negotiating process. See Peter Muchlinski, Trends in International Investment
Agreements, 1 Y.B. INT'L INV. L. & PoL'Y 35, 36-37 (2009) (discussing the growth of free trade agreements with investment chapters, and noting that this extends the scope of coverage to include "trade
in goods and services, intellectual property rights, competition, government procurement, temporary
entry for business persons, transparency and social issues such as environment and labor").
68. By way of example, one may cite three mechanisms used to exclude topics of concern to foreign investors. For example, many investment treaties distinguish between the pre-entry and post-entry phases
of investment, extending coverage only to the latter phase. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at
81; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 134-40. As a consequence, they aim chiefly to protect
(but not necessarily to liberalize) foreign investment. See id at 134. Even during the post-entry phase,
most investment treaties do not regulate the imposition of performance requirements that force investors to operate in ways designed to serve the interests of the host state, for example by achieving
certain levels of local content or export performance. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 82-83;
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 417-19, 422; Muchlinski, supra note 63, at 32. Furthermore,
investment treaties may include exceptions or reservations that deny coverage to particular economic sectors or that exclude certain types of measures. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 81;
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 138-39.
In addition, business interests regularly push for investment treaties that fail to materialize, including the OECD's failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the WTO's failed effort to develop investment rules. Muchlinski, supra note 63, at 7. To this, one might also add the failed effort to
negotiate a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas. See David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for
Review ofArbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L
L.39, 46-47 & n.31 (2006) (noting that problems have led to suspension of negotiations regarding
the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, describing the prospects of their conclusion as "increasingly remote," and opining that extension of the agreement to investment "is even more remote");
Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, AM. LAW/Focus EUROPE, Summer 2004,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourt04.html (referring to the stalled negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas).
69. See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United StatesChile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 679, 764-65 (2004) (recording the objections of
the United States business community to the perceived retreat from investor protection reflected in
recent free trade agreements and the United States Model BIT of 2004). See also William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States
Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 25 n.139 (2006) (mentioning the United States
business community's apparent disappointment at the omission of investor-state arbitration from the
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement).
70. See Ari Afilalo, Meaning Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-)Construction of NAFTA Chapter 11, 25
N.W. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 279, 297-302 (2005); Brower, supra note 66, at 355-56; Charles H. Brower, II,
Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L.37, 59-63 (2003); Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time For a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations
in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 237, 259-60 (2007); Nick Ranieri & James R.
Holbein, Balancing Investors' Rights with Public Policy in the NAFTA Context, in NAFTA CHAPTER 11
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commercial certainty seems unlikely to represent a core function of investment treaties.
Consistent with the hypothesis just stated, a recent line of cases decided under the
NAFTA's investment chapter indicates that investment treaties and investment tribunals
play not a central, but a peripheral role in promoting commercial certainty for foreign investors. Thus, after the pro-investor trio of Metalclad v. Mexico,71 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada,72 and Pope & Talbot v. Canada,73 which threw the NAFTA parties into a state of near

panic, 7 4 a different trinity emerged. First, in 2003, the tribunal in Loewen Group Inc. v. UnitINVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, Booklet C.19.3, at 11 (Nick Ranieri &James R. Holbein eds., 2007); Salacuse, supra note 63, at 452-53; Stiglitz, supra note 44, at 12, 39, 50; Yackee, supra note 38, at 221

71.

n.120; Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided InternationalInvestment Law Regime and Its Effect on the Future ofInvestor-State Arbitration,47 VA. J. INT'L L.953, 959-62 (2007).
MetalcladAward, supra note 43.
available

at

72.

2000),
(Nov.
13,
v.
Can.,
Award
Myers,
Inc.
S.D.
http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-249-2000.pdf.

73.

Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Can., Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-193-2001.pdf.

74. It seems well accepted that this trio of decisions prompted the NAFTA Parties to cause their representatives on the Free Trade Commission to adopt the often-criticized Notes of Interpretation regarding NAFTA Article 1105. See Brower, FTC Notes, supra note 33, at 354; Kenneth Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model BITs, 1 Y.B. INT'L L.& POL'Y 283, 290-91 (2009); Courtney C.
Kirkman, Note, Fairand Equitable Treatment: Methanex v. United States and the Narrowing Scope of
NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L BUS. 343, 390 (2002). See also Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v.
at
2010),
available
(Mar.
31,
1
189
Award,
Canada,
http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-427-2010.pdf [hereinafter Merrill &
Ring Award]; Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 103 (Oct. 11, 2002),
2002 WL 32841359 [hereinafter Mondev Award]; Michael Ewing-Chow, Investor Protection in Free
Trade Agreements: Lessons from North America, 5 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L.748, 769 (2001); Gantz, supra

note 69, at 713; filrgen Kurtz, A GeneralInvestment Agreement in the WTO?Lessons from Chapter11 of
NAFTA and the OECD MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 713, 754-55
(2002); Ian Laird, Betrayal, Shock and Outrage-Recent Developments in NAFTA Article 1105, in
NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 49, 62, 65 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004); Marc C. Poirier, The
NAFTA Chapter 11 ExpropriationDebate Through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L.851, 853
n.10 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionalityof InternationalDelegations, 104 CoLUM. L. REV.
1492, 1525 n.125 (2004); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Law in 2001: As the Legal Order Starts to
Settle, the Bureaucrats Strike Back, 36 INT'L LAW. 345, 347 (2002) [hereinafter Weiler, Bureaucrats
Strike Back].
Some have concluded that the resulting instrument has in some respects the character of an
amendment, which lies beyond the power of the Free Trade Commission to adopt. See Merrill & Ring
Award, supra, 192; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Can., Award in Respect of Damages, 7 47 (May 31, 2002),
Second
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-195-2002.pdf;
Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C. (Sept. 6, 2001) at 4-5, Methanex Corp. v. United States,

at

available

http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexResubAmendStateClaimAppend.pdf;
Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration:NAFTA Chapter
11, 28 YALE 1. INT'L L. 365, 397 (2003); Brower, Beware the Jabberwock,supra note 7, at 486 n.142

(2002); Charles H.Brower,

II,Fairand Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's Investment Chapter,96 AM.

SOc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 9, 10 (2002); Brower, Empire Strikes Back, supra note 7, at 56 n.71; Charles H.
Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fearand Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 78
n.249 (2002); Brower, FTC Notes, supra note 33, at 358-63; Charles N. Brower, NAFTA's Investment
Chapter: Dynamic Laboratory,Failed Experiments, and Lessonsfor the FTAA, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.

251, 255 (2003); Ian A. Laird, Betrayal, Shock and Outrage-RecentDevelopments in NAFTA Article
1105, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: THE EARLY YEARS 49 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004); William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1241, 1305 (2003); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of InternationalEconomic Law, 36 CAN. Bus. L.J. 405, 429 (2002); Weiler, BureaucratsStrike Back, supra, at

347.
Others have criticized as inconsistent with fair process the self-interested adoption of new stan191
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ed States expressed the view that arbitrators should not to display "too great a readiness to
step from outside into the domestic arena" and to impose liability even for serious "local
error[s]." 75 In other words, contrary to the ubiquitous role of domestic courts in applying
the dispute-settlement provisions of commercial agreements to promote commercial certainty, tribunals should apply investment treaties to provide relief only in extraordinary
cases. Two years later, the tribunal in Methanex Corp. v. United States operationalized the
principle by declaring that non-discriminatory regulations enacted for public purposes in
accordance with due process fall outside the scope of expropriation.76 Most recently, in
2009, the tribunal in Glamis Gold v. United States declared that the guarantee of "fair and
equitable treatment" in NAFTA Article 1105 prohibits only the sort of "egregious," "outrageous" or "shocking" government acts condemned in Neer v. Mexico during 1926.77 Together, the Loewen, Methanex, and Glamis awards represent a decisive shift away from the
promotion of commercial certainty for investors and towards preservation of regulatory
space for host states.
Given the Free Trade Commission's Notes of Interpretation regarding NAFTA Article
1105 (which equates "fair and equitable treatment" to the minimum standard of treatment
for aliens under customary international law),78 and the United States' frequent role as a
respondent in disputes under the NAFTA's investment chapter,79 one might limit Loewen,
Methanex, and Glamis to the North American context and take the position that they do not
necessarily reflect broader trends. State practice, however, emphatically signals a trend
towards the rebalancing of investment treaties to protect the regulatory space of host
states.
In a move described by a former President of the International Court of Justice as the
"regressive development of international law,"8 0 the United States comprehensively redards when combined with their application to ongoing disputes. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra
note 38, at 35; Brower, Beware thejabberwock,supra note 7, at 485-87; Brower, supra note 70, at 8182; Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration Under BilateralInvestment Treaties to Seek
Relieffor Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 493, 499 (2003). See also KINGDOM OF NORWAY STATE
SECRETARY

COMM.,

DRAFT

NORWEGIAN

MODEL

BIT

art.

23(4)(ii)

(2007),

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/hoeringer/Utkast%20til%20modellavtale2.doc
[hereinafter Draft Norwegian Model BIT] (admonishing the coordinate body to "refrain from adopting
interpretations of provisions already submitted to a Tribunal in a dispute between a Party and an Investor of the other Party").
75. Loewen Award, supra note 62, T 242.
76. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Award at pt. IV,ch. D, 7 (Aug. 3, 2005); M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 39 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008) (construing the Methanex award as excluding reg-

ulatory takings from the definition of expropriation).
18-22, 598-617, 627, 824-29 (June 8, 2009), available at
77. Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Award,
http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-380-2009.pdf [hereinafter Glamis
Award].
78. Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, § B, July 31, 2001, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf.

79. As of this writing, the Department of State's website lists fifteen claims brought against the United
80.

States under NAFTA Chapter 11 since 1998. See Cases FiledAgainst the United States ofAmerica, U.S.
DEP'TOF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm (last visited June 19, 2011).
See Stephen M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model BilateralInvestment Treaty:An Exercise in the
Regressive Development of International Law, TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MGMT, Apr. 2006,
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com; Stephen M.Schwebel, The influence of Bilateral
Investment Treaties on Customary InternationalLaw, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.PROC. 27, 30 (2004) (opining
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vised its model BIT in 2004 with the intent of reducing the jurisprudential discretion of
tribunals and increasing the regulatory discretion of host states."' Thus, while retaining a
provision on "fair and equitable treatment,"82 the United States Model BIT of 2004 expressly defines that concept to embrace the "minimum" standard of treatment required by customary international law,83 as documented by actual state practice (as opposed to aspirational best practice). 84 Likewise, while retaining a provision on expropriation,8 5 the United
States Model BIT of 2004 provides that nondiscriminatory regulatory actions designed to
protect public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations "[e]xcept in rare circumstances."8 6 Furthermore, it reserves the right of states parties acting jointly to remove issues from tribunal consideration and to resolve them at the political level,87 a possibility that seems difficult to square
with the promotion of commercial certainty. Finally, the United States seems disposed to
draft a new model BIT that could tilt even further towards the preservation of regulatory
space for host states.88
Looking beyond the United States, Canada also adopted a new model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement during 2004.89 In addition to provisions mirroring the United
that the new U.S. model BIT "embodies regressive changes that are deplorable").
Vandevelde, supra note 74, at 288. See also McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 22 (indicating that the
new U.S. model BIT "incorporates numerous innovations designed to reflect the public interests of
States"); Brower, supra note 66, at 357 n.55 (indicating that the United States' 2004 Model BIT was
"designed to increase the protection for host countries at the expense of investor protection"); Gilbert
Gagn6 & Jean-Frid6ric Morin, The Evolving American Policy on Investment Protection:Evidence from
Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, 9 1. INT'L EcON. L.357, 367 (2006) (explaining that the new U.S.
model BIT includes "substantial clarifications aimed at limiting the scope of... obligations" relating to
expropriation and the minimum standard of treatment).
5(1)
(2004),
BIT
art.
U.S.
MODEL
OF
STATE,
82. See
DEP'T
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
83. See id.art. 5(2).
84. See id. annex A.
85. See id. art. 6.
86. See id. annex B, 4(b).
87. See id. arts. 30(3), 31(2), 37(4); Vandevelde, supra note 74, at 296.
88. See Damon Vis-Dunbar, United States Reviews its Model Investment Treaty, INV. TREATY NEWS, June 5,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/06/05/united-states2009,
reviews-its-model-bilateral-investment-treaty.aspx (reporting that "[t]he United States has embarked
on a review of its model bilateral investment treaty"). In June 2009, the State Department and United
States Trade Representative asked the Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy to establish a subcommittee to review the United States Model BIT, devoting particular attention to dispute settlement, state-owned enterprises, and financial services issues. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
81.

SUBCOMM. ON INV. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON INT'L ECON. POL'Y, REPORT REGARDING THE MODEL BILATERAL

89.

INVESTMENT TREATY (2009), availableat http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2009/131098.htm.
When the subcommittee tendered its report in September 2009, nine of twenty-nine members
adopted a statement calling for "a fresh approach to bilateral investment treaties and the investment
chapters of trade agreements," which would eliminate investor-state arbitration, codify the United
States' litigation position in Glamis with respect to the minimum standard of treatment, limit the definition of indirect expropriation to physical seizure or appropriation by the host state, eviscerate the
most-favored-nation treatment standard, limit the national-treatment standard to cases of intentional
discrimination, and incorporate general exceptions for health, safety and environmental measures.
See id., annex B, Collective Statement of Sarah Anderson, Linda Andros, Marcos Orellana Cruz, Elizabeth Drake, Kevin P. Gallagher, Owen Herrnstadt, Matthew C.Porterfield, Margrete Strand Rangnes,
and Martin Wagner.
Canada's Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (2004),
[hereinafter Canadian Model
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf
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States' refinements on the minimum standard of treatment and the power of states parties
to remove certain issues from tribunal consideration,9 0 the Canadian model includes a provision on expropriation that resembles its U.S. counterpart,9 1 but differs in tone. Thus,
while reiterating the principle that non-discriminatory regulations adopted for public welfare purposes do not constitute indirect expropriations "[elxcept in rare circumstances,"92
the Canadian text emphasizes just how exceptional circumstances must become for regulations to cross the threshold of expropriation. Specifically, the Canadian text refers to situations in which "a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light of their purpose
that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith."93
In addition, the Canadian model breaks new ground by incorporating general exceptions
drawn almost verbatim from Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 94
Thus, it expressly reserves the rights of states parties to adopt and enforce measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or necessary for the conservation
of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources. 95 Even according to an observer not
known for his sympathy towards foreign investors, the exceptions contained in the Canadian model "are so extensive as to raise the question as to whether they ... undermine the
scope of the treaty."9 6
Moving beyond North America, Norway unveiled a draft model BIT in December 2007.91
Like its U.S. and Canadian counterparts, the Norwegian text assimilates "fair and equitable
treatment" to the minimum standard of treatment for aliens under customary international
law,98 and authorizes the states parties to remove certain issues from tribunal consideration. 99 While including a provision on expropriation, 100 the Norwegian model defines the
concept even more narrowly than the Canadian version. Thus, without including a qualification for exceptional circumstances, the text simply reserves the right of states parties to
"enforce such laws as [they] deem[] necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest."101 Though somewhat longer and more extensive than its CanaFIPA].

90. Id arts. 5(2), 40(2), 41(2).
91. Id.art.13.
92. Id., annex B.13(1)(c).
93. Id.
94. Compare id. art. 10(1), with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
95. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 89, art. 10(1).
96. Sornarajah, supra note 76, at 41.
97. Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 74.
98. Id. art. 5; KINGDOM OF NORWAY STATE SECRETARY COMM., [OFFICIAL] COMMENTS ON THE [NORWEGIAN] MODEL
21
(2007),
INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS
FOR
FUTURE
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/hoeringer/2008/Forklarende%20vedlegg%20(e
ngelsk)%20-%20final.doc [hereinafter Official Comments on Draft Norwegian Model BIT] (translating same from Norweigan).
99. Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 74, art 14(2). But see id. art. 23(4)(ii) (admonishing the states
parties not to (1) use interpretations as a means of circumventing the treaty's provisions on amendment, or (2) adopt interpretations for the purpose of determining the outcomes of pending disputes).
However, the official commentary makes it clear that, while often not desirable, the states parties
have the power to adopt binding interpretations on matters pending before tribunals. See Official
Comments on Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 98, at 43.
100. See Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 74, art 6(1).
101. Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 74, art. 6(2). Further emphasizing the regulatory prerogatives
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dian counterpart, the Norwegian text also includes a list of general exceptions drawn almost verbatim from Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 102 Thus, it
preserves the right of states parties to adopt measures necessary to "protect public morals
or to maintain public order," to "protect human, animal or plant life or health," or to protect
"the environment."103 Unlike its Canadian counterpart, the Norwegian text defines necessity broadly to encompass measures justified by the "precautionary principle." 104
Viewed from the perspective of substantive provisions, the Norwegian text seems only
somewhat more ambitious than the Canadian model in terms of preserving regulatory
space for host states. However, viewed from the perspective of overall tone, the Norwegian
text signals a fundamental change. Thus, the preamble (1) expresses a desire to achieve the
treaty's objectives "in a manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labour rights"; (2) emphasizes
the "importance of corporate social responsibility"; (3) reaffirms the "commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms"; and (4) recognizes the
need for "mutually supportive" interpretations of investment and environmental treaties.10s Later, while elaborated in language that lends itself to a variety of constructions, the
Norwegian text contains an article on the "Right to Regulate."10 6 As implied by the text's
overall tone, the official commentary explains that the Norwegian government sought to
"lead the development from one-sided agreements that only safeguard the interests of the
107
investor to comprehensive agreements that [also] safeguard ... regulative needs."
Roughly eighteen months after its release, the Norwegian government shelved the draft
text following an overwhelmingly critical, but polarized, response.10 While the business

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

107.
108.

of states, the Norwegian text provides that measures applied "in pursuance of legitimate policy objectives of public interest such as the protection of public health, safety and the environment" do not violate disciplines on national treatment or MFN treatment when they bear a "reasonable relationship
to rational policies" not motivated by discriminatory animus. Id. arts. 3(1) &n.2, 4(1) & n.3.
Compare Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 74, art. 24, with GATT, supra,note 94, art. XX.
Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 74, art. 24(i), (ii), (v).
Id. art. 24 & n.6.
Id. pmbl.
Id. art. 12. The relevant passage provides that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this
Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns." Id. (emphasis added).
On the one hand, the highlighted language has a textual counterpart in the NAFTA, which some
have described as a "tautological" or "hortatory" provision that does not enhance the regulatory flexibility of states. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1114, Dec. 17, 1992,
art 1114, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 509;
Todd Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Merits Award in S.D. Myers, Inc v. Canada: Is It Possibleto Balance Legitimate Environmental Concernswith Investment Protection?,24 HASTINGS INT'L &COMP. L.REV.
173, 181-82 (2001).
On the other hand, the heading used in the Norwegian text ("Right to Regulate") may provide emphatic context for interpretations regarding the scope of investors' rights. See Official Comments on
Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 98, at 27 (concluding that "the main significance of the provision is as an additional interpretive factor for the scope of the protection provisions of the agreement").
See Official Comments on Draft Norwegian Model BIT, supra note 98, at 10.
Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves Its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INv. TREATY NEWS,
June 8, 2009, http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/200 9 /06/0 8 /norwayshelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investment-treaty.aspx.
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community felt that the draft did not provide investors with sufficient protection, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complained that it placed too many restraints on the
government's capacity to regulate.10 9
Turning from the practice of developed states to trends among developing states, one
finds similar forces at work. In the growing network of so-called South-to-South investment treaties, which now account for over one quarter of the worldwide stock of investment treaties, 10 one tends to find limitations in the levels of protection not normally included in North-to-South treaties."1 Also, given the series of high-stakes and high-profile
claims against Argentina,11 2 other states in the region have begun to denounce existing investment treaties,11 3 to renounce investor-state arbitration in whole or in part under the
ICSID Convention,11 4 or to refrain from the conclusion of new investment treaties."15
While some describe the phenomenon as a "recalibration" or "reappraisal" of international investment law (thus suggesting a change in course)," 6 the fact is that recent tribunal decisions and state practice emphasize not the promotion of certainty for foreign investors, but preservation of regulatory space for host states. Viewed from this perspective,
investment treaties serve not to protect foreign investors from disappointment in their relations with host states,117 from breaches of commercial agreements by host states, 118 from

109. Id.
110. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 52 n.33; Muchlinski, supra note 67, at 38; Salacuse, supra note 63, at
433-34; Karl P. Sauvant, The Rise of InternationalInvestment, Investment Agreements and Investment
Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 76, at 3, 9.
111. Anna Joubin-Bret, The Growing Diversity and Inconsistency in the IIA System, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 76, at 137, 139.
112. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary
Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties,48 VA. J.INT'L L.307, 309-11 (2008) (describing the social, political and economic turmoil in Argentina during 2001, which triggered forty-three investment treaty arbitrations seeking
roughly $8 billion, an amount that exceeded the Argentina's financial reserves in 2002).
113. See Salacuse, supra note 63, at 469-70 (describing Venezuela's termination of its BIT with the Netherlands, Ecuador's termination of nine BITs, and Bolivia's declaration of intent to renegotiate its BITs).
See also Stiglitz, supra note 44, at 14-15 (calling for a "serious rollback in agreements already
signed").
114. See Salacuse, supra note 63, at 469 (reporting Bolivia's withdrawal from the ICSID Convention in
2007, as well as Ecuador's withdrawal in 2010).
115. See Alan Beattie, Concern Grows over Global Trade Regulation,FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at 9, available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/58699264-ef9c-1ldc-8al7-0000779fd2ac,sO1=1.html (quoting a senior Brazilian official and a Washington trade lawyer for the proposition that the claims against Argentina have raised concerns which have made it difficult or impossible for Brazil to conclude new
investment treaties).
116. See Patrick julliard, Can the Imbalance Be Redressed?, 1 Y.B. INT'L INV. L.& PoL'Y 273, 280 (2009) (concluding that "BITs are presently undergoing some kind of reappraisal"); Julian Davis Mortenson, The
Meaning of "Investment": ICS/D's Traveaux and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 257, 314 (2010) (suggesting that "increasing resistance to the international investment regime should prompt ... a recalibration of the mechanisms of deference to state decisions on substantive questions of investment law"). See also Vandevelde, supra note 74, at 314 (describing the United
States' 2004 Model BIT as "an instrument of retrenchment").
117. Azinian v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, 83 (Nov. 1, 1999), 1999 WL 33946449.
118. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, TT 114, 160 (Apr. 30, 2004), 2004
WL 3249803. However, as stated above, the presence of a so-called umbrella clause may have the effect of elevating certain breaches of contract into treaty violations. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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incremental development of law by host states,119 or even violations of domestic law by the
officials of host states. 120 In other words, the emerging narrative does not track the Supreme Court's business planning narrative. To the contrary, the emerging narrative seems
to focus on the guarantee of incremental protection from serious governmental abuses.

III. The Human Rights Narrative
Assuming that protection from abuse has become a focus of investment treaty practice,
one feels the temptation to draw on human rights narratives to describe the function of investment treaties. Although first raised with irony in academic discourse on critical race
theory and although historically resisted by tribunals when deciding investment disputes,
this perspective has gained a measure of credence among observers and at least one tribunal, which used an investment treaty to provide remedies for paradigmatic human rights
violations.
As far as the author knows, Professor Jos6 E. Alvarez drew the first analogy between investment treaties and human rights treaties in 1997, during a conference at which he observed that the application of critical race insights to foreign relations would "benefit both
international lawyers and traditional race critics, albeit for different reasons."1 21 Developing this theme, Alvarez predicted that race critics would discover how U.S. treaty practice
"serves to entrench or even exacerbate racial and ethnic divides within other nations." 122
Following with concrete examples, Alvarez unveiled a sharp assessment of the NAFTA's investment chapter, which he described as "the most bizarre human rights treaty ever conceived." 123
As described by Alvarez, the NAFTA's investment chapter grants foreign investors "direct access to binding denationalized adjudication of any governmental measure that interferes with their ample rights." 124 Elaborating the substance of those rights, Alvarez explained that they echo many of the themes contained in the principal human rights
instruments, including the rights to security and undisturbed ownership of property, as
well as the freedom of movement and freedom from discrimination. 125 Contrasting these
with the complete absence of any rights or freedoms granted to the local employees of foreign investors, Alvarez condemned the NAFTA's investment chapter as a "human rights
treaty for a special-interest group." 126
In addition to emphasizing the disparity of concern for the interests of corporations and
the physical welfare of human beings in U.S. treaty practice, Alvarez consciously sought to
juxtapose concepts (investment treaties and human rights) not often regarded as logical
pairs. 127 Viewed from this latter perspective, his discourse accurately captured the state of
119. Parkerings Award,supra note 41, T 332; MondevAward, supra note 74, T 133.
120. GlamisAward, supra note 77, 770.
121. Jos6 E.Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 303 (1997).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 307.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 307-08.
126. Id. at 308-09.
127. See id. at 309 ("It might be said that the comparison between the NAFTA and human rights instru-
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play for investment arbitration. 128 As of the 1990's, tribunals showed a strong preference
for maintaining rigorous distinctions between international investment and human rights
law. For example, in Biloune v. Ghana Invs. Ctr., Ghanaian authorities ordered a Syrian investor to stop work on a construction project previously approved by the host government,
and then partially demolished the works before expiration of the time allotted to the investor for responding to the stop-work order. 129 Contemporaneously, Ghanaian authorities
commenced an investigation into financial improprieties allegedly committed by the investor, arrested him at night, held him without charge for thirteen days, and permanently deported him, summarily terminating his residence in Ghana after more than two decades.130
Invoking the dispute-settlement provisions of his investment agreement with the host
state, the Syrian investor commenced an ad hoc arbitration in which he accused the host
state and related entities of expropriating his investment by permanently depriving him of
the opportunity to complete the construction project.' 3 In addition, he claimed that the
host state violated his human rights by subjecting him to arbitrary arrest and detention. 132
While accepting that the investor's permanent deportation supported his claim for expropriation, the tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the human rights claim as
such because the host state's consent to arbitration extended only to disputes "in respect
of" foreign investment.13 s
Perhaps motivated by Professor Alvarez's challenge for stakeholders to adopt broader
frames of reference for analysis of investment treaties,13 4 observers and tribunals have begun to explore the ways in which human rights could inform the application of investment
treaties. At the level of theory, one writer probed the genealogy of modern international
law on (1) civil and political rights, and (2) the protection of foreign investment, tracing the
development of both subjects to a common foundation in the customary international law
of state responsibility for injuries to aliens.13s As a result, one could easily discern a shared
emphasis on the creation of zones of autonomy or freedom from governmental intervention.136 More importantly, however, the recognition of shared roots tends to contradict the
need for maintaining rigorous distinctions between human rights and international investment law. To the contrary, the existence of a common source justifies a measure of
cross-fertilization between the two traditions. Consistent with this observation, other
ments is .. . a rhetorical stance that is . . . questionable ....

128.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Nonetheless, the idea that NAFTA advo-

cates would find comparisons with human rights instruments inapposite or absurd ... shows the limited frame of reference in which the treaty was negotiated.").
See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 108 (recognizing that "human rights arguments have
been rare" in the field of investment treaty arbitration); Andrea K.Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial ofJustice Claims, 45 VA. J.INT'L L.809, 861 (2005) (observing
that investment treaty tribunals "have only rarely turned to the guidance that might be provided by..
. human rights tribunals").
Biloune v. Ghana Invs. Ctr., 95 1.L.R. 183, 195 (Arb. Trib. 1989).
Id. at 191, 197-200.
Id. at 187, 209.
Id. at 187, 203.
Id. at 203, 209.
See Alvarez, supra note 121, at 309.
See Charles H. Brower, II, NAFTA's Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-Generation
Rights, 36 VAND. J.TRANSNATL L. 1533, 1546-47 (2003).
Id. at 1547-48.
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writers have recognized that human rights may have a role to play in the application of investment treaties depending on their precise wording and the nature of the underlying
claims.' 37
Moving from theory to practice, at least one recent award supports the use of investment treaties to redress the sort of abuse normally associated with human rights violations. Thus, in Desert Line Projects v. Yemen, the host state's president invited an Omani investor to undertake road construction projects of signal importance for the host state's
national security and economic development.'3 8 Despite the absence of a clear agreement
on compensation, the head of state encouraged the investor to begin and to continue work,
promising that he would receive fair remuneration in due course.' 39 Notwithstanding such
assurances, the host state made no progress payments for eighteen months, then provided
a measure of compensation but quickly fell behind, and finally declared that it had actually
overpaid for the work completed to date.140 When the investor threatened to stop work,
the host state subjected his construction sites to treatment described by one senior military commander as a "siege."141 Thus, faced with enormous pressure to continue work, the
investor consented to a summary arbitration procedure in which the head of state instructed the Yemeni tribunal not to consider the underlying contract or the investor's actual costs when establishing the measure of compensation.142
While the Yemeni arbitral tribunal heard and decided the case in just six weeks, did not
provide any reasons for its decision, and allegedly committed vast miscalculations, it rendered a substantial award in favor of the investor. 143 Rather than directing his government
to satisfy the award, however, the head of state "advised" the investor that it would be "in
[his] interest" to accept a far lower sum offered by the Ministry of Public Works.144 ,Contemporaneously, the host state renewed a "siege" of the investor's construction site, arrested three of his managers (including his son), and denied his operations protection from
"harassment, threat and theft by armed third parties."145 Shortly thereafter, the investor's
contacts in Yemen warned him to leave the country because his life was in danger.146 Under these circumstances, the investor departed from Yemen, accepted an unfavorable settlement agreement with the host state through local agents, and then commenced a second
arbitration against the host state under a bilateral investment treaty. 147
Although the host state pleaded the settlement agreement as a definitive resolution of
the investor's claims, the investment treaty tribunal regarded that instrument as the prod137. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 107. See also Bjorklund, supra note 128, at 861 (describing the reluctance of investment treaty tribunals to consult human rights jurisprudence as a "regrettable failure to use all available resources and to commence a dialogue among the bodies that make
important decisions about the standards for a functioning judicial system").
138. Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, IT 4-5, 164 (Feb. 6, 2008),
2008 WL 2912764 [hereinafter DesertLine ProjectsAward].
5, 24, 165, 182, 185, 188.
139. Id.
140. Id.
165-66.
141. Id.
18, 22, 25-27, 166-67.
142. Id. 29, 166-68.
143. Id. IT 30-32, 169-70.
144. Id.
41, 127(e), 170, 179.
145. Id. 17 33, 38, 179, 185.
146. Id. 185.
147. Id. 1 38-41,43,48, 50, 144, 146.
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uct of "physical and financial duress."148 Consequently, the settlement agreement possessed no legal force and could not defeat the investor's treaty claim.14 9 Turning to the merits of that claim, the tribunal described the host state's use of physical and financial coercion as a denial of the "fair and equitable treatment" required by the investment treaty. 5 0
To remedy that violation, the tribunal awarded the investor the full amount of the Yemeni
arbitral award, minus the sums already paid by the host state under the coerced settlement
agreement.15s
In addition to restoring the economic and financial status quo ante, the tribunal also
granted the investor's claim for "moral damages" to compensate for the "stress and anxiety
of being harassed, threatened, and detained by the [host state] as well as by armed tribes."sz While recognizing that investment treaties primarily aim to protect economic and
property interests, the tribunal concluded that the "malicious" application of "physical duress" justified an award of moral damages in the "modest" amount of $1 million. 53
Although described by the tribunal as a financial consequence of the investment treaty
violation, the award of moral damages represents a striking development in the investment context,154 where treaties seek to regulate economic relationships involving substantial commitments of resources, where disputes involve substantial economic losses, and
where damage awards focus on economic concepts.155 By contrast, awards of moral damages seem more deeply rooted in human rights jurisprudence,15 6 where claimants frequently experience pain, suffering, mental anguish, and humiliation without substantial
economic loss. 5 7 Given these facts, one might describe the Desert Line Projects award as a
148. Id. Ty 142, 145, 147, 186, 194.
149. Id. TT 148-49, 157-58, 162, 179, 186, 194.
150. Id.
190-94.
195, 204-05, 246-47.
151. Id.
152. Id. TT 286, 289-91.
289-91.
153. Id.
154. See SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 309 (2008) (observing that "claims for recovery of moral damages have been made in very few investment arbitrations").
155. See id. at 307 ("In the context of investment disputes, losses almost invariably concern material damage, ie [sic] damage to property, contractual or other economic interests of investors.").
156. See Luke Eric Petersen, Enforceabilityof SADC]udgmentAgainstZimbabwe Unclear,INV.ARB. REP., Dec.
11, 2008, at 16 ("While commonplace in international human rights jurisprudence, moral damages
are less often seen in investment treaty arbitrations."). See also Jo M. Pasqualucci, Victim Reparations
in the Inter-American Human Rights System: A CriticalAssessment of Current Practice and Procedure,
18 MICH. J.INT'L L. 1, 32 (1996) ("International law traditionally provides for moral damages for emotional harm suffered by the injured party, particularlyin the case of human rights violations.") (emphasis added); Victor M. Rodriguez Rescia, Reparations in the Inter-American System for the Protection
of Human Rights, 5 ILSA 1.INT'L & COMP. L. 583, 598 (1999) (explaining that, for human rights violations, moral damages represent the "damage that is most justly recouped").
157. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 154, at 308 (emphasizing the practice of the European and InterAmerican Courts of Human Rights to award moral damages for "pain and suffering, mental anguish,
[and] humiliation."). See also Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations:
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351, 391 (2008)
(observing that awards of moral damages have pragmatic application in human rights claims because
"hard evidence of material loss is often scarce"); Ben Saul, Compensationfor Unlawful Death in International Law: A Focus on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 523, 556
(2004) (emphasizing that suffering represents a touchstone for the assessment of moral damages,
which may be assumed in grave human rights violations involving death, disappearances, incommunicado detention, and torture).

200
HeinOnline -- 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 200 2011

Corporationsas Plaintiffs Under InternationalLaw

rare but concrete example that proves the viability of drawing on human rights narratives
to guide the application of investment treaties, at least in cases where the host state's conduct involves the sort of abuse normally associated with human rights violations.15 8
While some have emphasized the extraordinary nature of the circumstances justifying
moral damages in investment claims, 1s9 that was not always the case. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, investment claims often resembled the sorts of human rights claims that call for moral damages. 160 Upon reflection, the overlap makes sense.
At the time, foreign investors had to justify their claims under the customary law of state
responsibility for injuries to aliens, 161 which also served as a conceptual foundation for the
development of international law on civil and political rights.162 Under those circumstances, investment claims necessarily resembled human rights claims.
Subsequently, capital-exporting states used investment treaties as a tool to clarify and
strengthen international standards for the protection of foreign investment,1 63 which eventually drew the discipline beyond the customary standards associated with human rights
law.164 However, as noted above, recent investment treaty practice signals a retreat from
158. But see ADM Award, supra note 64, 171 (rejecting the proposition that "the nature of investors'
rights under [NAFTA's investment chapter are] comparable with the protections conferred by human
rights treaties").
159. See Desert Line ProjectsAward, supra note 138, 289; RIPINSKY &WILLIAMS, supra note 154, at 310-11.
160. See Bjorklund, supra note 128, at 817 (observing that early denial-of-justice cases involved allegations that would support human rights claims today); Luke Eric Peterson, The Future of Moral Dam14,
2009),
BLOG
(Apr.
ARBITRATION
ages in
Investment Arbitration, KLUWER
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/04/14/the-future-of-moral-damages-in-investmenttreaty-arbitration (conjuring "memories of.. . older days ... when alien claims oftentimes looked like
'human rights' claims with businesspersons roughed up, arrested on trumped up charges, and left to
stew in custody for long stretches"). See also Merrill & Ring Award, supra note 74, TT 195-201 (describing early cases that involved violations of due process, denial of justice, and physical mistreatment as a "first track" in the development of international minimum standards for the treatment of
aliens).
161. See Bjorklund, supra note 128, at 818 ("International investment protections, including the doctrine
of denial of justice, developed within the ambit of the law of state responsibility for injuries to
aliens."); Ryan J.Bubb & Susan Rose-Ackerman, BITs and Bargains:StrategicAspects of Bilateraland
MultilateralRegulation of Foreign Investment, 27 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 293 (2007) ("Prior to the
modern era of bilateral investment treaties, customary international law on foreign investment provided weak protections to foreign investment. Traditionally, the international law protecting the
property of foreign investors was part of the general law on state responsibility for injuries to
aliens."); Katherine E.Lyons, Piercing the CorporateVeil in the InternationalArena, 33 SYRACUSE J.INT'L
L.& COM. 523, 527 (2006) ("International law on foreign investment grew out of the already existing
norms on the 'diplomatic protection of citizens abroad and of state responsibility for injuries to
aliens.' ").

162. See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 104 (1999) (describing the law of
state responsibility as "a precursor to international human rights law"); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 86 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the law of state responsibility
as "a branch of international law that was among the important predecessors to contemporary human rights law"). See also Merrill& Ring Award, supra note 74, 7 201 (describing the process by which
the international minimum standard for the treatment of aliens merged into human rights law).
163. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 41; M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 213 (2d ed. 2004); Salacuse, supra note 63, at 436-40.
164. See Merrill & Ring Award, supra note 74, TV 205-13 (describing the rise of specialized regimes for the
protection of foreign investment and the contemporaneous appearance of a more liberal "second
track" concerning the development of international minimum standards for the treatment of aliens in
the context of business, trade and investment). See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT & WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS 5-6 (2001) [hereinafter
PRIVATE RIGHTS], available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade-citizensguide.pdf (explaining that in-
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the high-water mark of investor protection and a return towards customary norms, 165 perhaps even to the very standards that prevailed during the early 1900's.166 To the extent
that "egregious," "outrageous," or "shocking" government conduct again become the standards for assessing the liability of hosts states, 167 successful investment claims will once
again come to resemble human rights claims. As that happens, one might feel not just the
temptation, but the obligation, to draw on human rights narratives when applying investment treaties.168
Despite the functional similarities, the shared historical roots, and the common emphasis on curtailing serious abuse by host states, one should not lose sight of compelling practical differences between human rights claims and investment treaty claims. To begin with,
most human rights claimants are individuals who seem relatively powerless and vulnerable compared to the respondent states. 169 Also, depending on the particular human rights
instrument, the opportunity to pursue individual complaints may not exist,170 or may be

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

170.

vestment treaties first sought to protect foreign investors from outright takings and discrimination
during the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's, but later expanded their scope to include undertakings with
respect to liberalization of foreign investment).
See supra notes 75-107 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Cf Bjorklund, supra note 128, at 819 (concluding that "to the extent that the human rights of investors are at stake, however, the legal regimes of investment protection and human rights protection
could eventually reintersect").
See STEINER ET AL., supra note 162, at 59.
In typical instances of [human rights] violations, the police of state X torture defendants to extract
confessions; the government of X shuts the opposition press as elections approach; prisoners are
raped by their guards; courts decide cases according to executive command; women or a minority
group are barred from education or certain work.
Id. Even when authoritarian governments take repressive action against wealthy and powerful individuals, they generally attack their victims as individuals,confiscating their assets, treating them as
common criminals (or worse), and thus emphasizing the vulnerability of anyone who dares to challenge the regime. See Yelina Kvurt, Note, Selective Prosecution in Russia-Myth or Reality, 15 CARDOZO
J.INT'L &COMP. L. 127, 127-30 & nn.1-14 (2007) (discussing the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a Russian citizen who founded one of the world's largest privately-held oil companies (Yukos) and became
the world's sixteenth wealthiest man, but whom the Russian government later subjected to arrest,
economic ruin, unfair trial, and a nine-year prison sentence in retaliation for his political ambitions).
See also Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Kremlin's Eye: The 21st Century Prokuratora in the Russian AuthoritarianTradition, 45 STAN. J.INT'L L.1, 33 (2009) (describing Khodorkovsky's prosecution as an exercise in "exemplary justice" designed to teach a political lesson to Russia's wealthy "oligarchs").
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, does not itself establish a procedure for hearing individual complaints regarding human rights violations. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. That job falls to the ICCPR's First Optional Protocol, an instrument ratified by only 113 of the 166 states parties to the ICCPR. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 1-5, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (establishing a procedure for hearing individual complaints) [hereinafter First Optional Protocol]. Compare Status of the InternationalCovenant on Civil
COLLECTION,
TREATY
NATIONS
UNITED
Rights,
Political
and
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en

(last visited June 19, 2011) (listing the 166 states parties to the ICCPR), with Status of Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en

(last visited June 19, 2011) (listing the 113 states parties to the First Optional Protocol).
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sharply curtailed. 171 Next, even when available, such mechanisms typically require claimants to exhaust local remedies 172 and may not result in binding decisions,17 3 much less
decisions capable of global enforcement in domestic courts. Finally, even when available
and effective, such mechanisms generally result in modest, if any, damage awards against
the respondent states. 74 In other words, human rights law provides comparatively weak
claimants with comparatively weak remedies.
By contrast, investment treaty claims often involve multinational corporations with
economic resources and leverage that may rival those of their host states. 17s Also, despite
some exceptions, most investment treaties guarantee claimants not only the right to submit claims directly to arbitration before international tribunals, 176 but also to influence the
composition of those tribunals.17 7 Next, when available, such mechanisms generally do not
require exhaustion of local remedies. 178 In addition, such mechanisms virtually always re171. Under the American Convention on Human Rights, individuals have the right to petition the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, but only the Commission and states parties may refer cases
to the inter-American Court of Human Rights. American Convention on Human Rights arts. 44, 61(1),
July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
172. See First Optional Protocol, supra note 170, art. 5(2)(b); American Convention on Human Rights, supro note 171, art. 46(1)(a); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 35(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, as amended by Protocol No. 11, openedfor signature
May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998). Among other things, the exhaustion requirement prevents international institutions from responding swiftly to human rights violations. See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Courtof Human Rights: Reflections on a joint Venture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q.439, 441 (1990).
173. See First Optional Protocol, supra note 170, art. 5(4) (providing that the Human Rights Committee
shall forward its "views" to the individual complainant and to the state party that is the subject of the
complaint). See also MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY
668-69 (2d ed. 2005) (emphasizing that the views of the Human Rights Committee lack binding legal
effect); HENRY J.STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 739 (2d ed. 2000)
(observing that the First Optional Protocol contains no provision recognizing the views of the Human
Rights Committee as binding legal determinations).
174. See R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2005] UKHL 14 (Eng.) (explaining that "the focus of the
[European] Convention is on the protection of human rights and not the award of compensation," and
that the European Court of Human Rights' monetary awards "have been noteworthy for their modesty"); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 224
(2002) (observing that the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights have awarded or
recommended only modest amounts of compensation or damages); DINAH L. SHELTON, REGIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 797 (2008) (discussing remedies in the European Court of Human
Rights and observing that "[v]iolations of procedural rights ... rarely have resulted in relief beyond a
declaration of violation[; n]o compensation has been given [to] most prisoners, except where physical
mistreatment is proven[;] homosexuals, vagrants, and aliens also generally have been denied compensation").
175. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 4 (indicating that the foreign investors protected by investment
treaties are "for the most part multinational firms"). See also SORNARAJAH, supra note 163, at 67 (observing that "[miany multinational corporations have financial resources that are greater than many
states can muster"); Stiglitz, supra note 44, at 16 (recognizing that the "economic powers [of multinational corporations] are huge-often far larger than that of the countries with which they are dealing").
176. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 52; LEW ET AL., supra note 33, at 763, 768; LOWENFELD, supra note 40, at
570; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 70; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 40, at 468. See also
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
177. See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 128; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 40, at 340.
178. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 120, 357; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 241; RUBINS &

KINSELLA, supra note 40, at 133-34, 272-73. There may, however, be an obligation to exhaust local
remedies in order to pursue claims based on a denial of justice. See Loewen Award, supra note 62, TV
142-57; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supranote 33, at 241-42.
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suit in binding awards capable of global enforcement in domestic courts under the ICSID
Convention (without any judicial review) or the New York Convention (with limited judicial review).179 Finally, while not always the case, the proceedings can result in substantial
damage awards against the respondent states.1 0 Depending on the state's resources, even
the cost of defending claims can be onerous. 181In other words, investment treaties provide
powerful claimants with powerful remedies. 182
Building on the points just made, one might portray investment treaties as forceful and
potentially dangerous tools that could empower foreign corporations (1) to intimidate host
states and, thus, to discourage them from regulating foreign investors even when needed
to safeguard the public interest, or (2) at least to neutralize the financial consequences of
regulation. Viewed from this perspective, one might either reject the use of human rights
narratives to guide the application of investment treaties or, as explained below, one might
invert the use of such narratives to protect host states and their citizens from the potentially harmful consequences of foreign investment.

179. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 287-88; DUGAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 87-88, 679; LEW ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 801, 803-04. One must take care, however, to draw a distinction between the enforcement of awards and the legally distinct issue of execution against assets. With respect to the latter question, principles of sovereign immunity can remain a serious impediment to securing compensation from recalcitrant states. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 289-90; DUGAN ET AL., supra note
40, at 684, 699-700; Alan S. Alexandroff & Ian A. Laird, Compliance and Enforcement, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 1171, 1176-85.

180. See Salacuse,supra note 6, at 142 (claiming that investment treaty awards can be "onerous" in relation to host-state resources, and citing four awards, which ranged from $71 million to $824 million).
One should bear in mind that investors lose slightly more cases than they win and, when successful,
tend to receive awards in the neighborhood of $25 million. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration,86 N.C. L.REV. 1, 49, 60 (2007) (concluding that investors won in 38.5% of surveyed cases, and that the average award fell into the range of $25.5 million).
However, even those statistics establish that tribunals impose liability in a substantial proportion of
cases and that average awards involve sums that can be substantial to states where GDP per capita
may range between $7 and $37 per day. See World Factbook Country Comparison: GDP-PerCapita,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, availableat https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (listing the annual GDP per capita of states, including $2,500 for
Pakistan and $13,400 for Argentina).
181. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 123 n.13 (reporting that one state spent half the budget for its Ministry of Justice in defending a single claim); Salacuse, supra note 6, at 143 (reporting that in CME v.
Czech, the respondent spent $10 million on its defense); Louis T. Wells, Letter to the Editor, Private
Justice System Can only Survive if PartiesConsider It just, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at 12 (reporting
that "the legal fees for a single case reach millions of dollars, which poor countries can ill afford").
182. In this context, it seems relevant to note that, while the founder of Yukos languishes in a Russian prison, that company's foreign investors have successfully invoked the jurisdiction of investment treaty
tribunals in order to neutralize the financial consequences of Russia's purported efforts to destroy
Yukos. See generally Hulley Enters. Ltd. v. Russ., PCA Case No. AA 226, Interim Award on Admissibility
at
available
30,
2009),
(Nov.
jurisdiction
and
Veteran Petroleum
http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-415-2009.pdf;
Ltd. v. Russ., PCA Case No. AA 228, Interim Award on Admissibility and jurisdiction (Nov. 30, 2009),
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-417-2009.pdf; Yukos
Universal Ltd. v. Russ., PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Admissibility and Jurisdiction (Nov.
30, 2009), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-4162009.pdf; Renta 4 SVSA v. Russ., SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award on Preliminary Objections (Mar. 20,
2009), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-369-2009.pdf;
Rosinvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russ., SCC Case V079/2005, Award on jurisdiction (Oct. 5, 2007), availableat
http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-315-2007.pdf.
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IV. The Anti-Globalist Narrative
Assuming that investment treaties impair the capacity of host states to regulate or even
to protect the human rights of their citizens, one might feel the temptation to draw on antiglobalist narratives to describe the function of investment treaties. As explained below,
this perspective has found purchase in the work of advocacy groups, mainstream journalism, the highest levels of academic discourse, and human rights reports within the United
Nations system.
As far as the author recalls, advocacy groups first trumpeted the anti-globalist perspective on investment treaties. After spearheading a successful campaign to scuttle the OECD's
draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) during the late 1990's, 183 many advocacy groups sought to discredit the NAFTA's investment chapter,18 4 which seemed a likely
starting point for negotiations regarding the investment disciplines in a Free Trade Area
for the Americas (FTAA). 18s For example, in 2001, the International Institute for Sustainable Development and the World Wildlife Fund published a layman's guide to the NAFTA's
investment chapter, which warned that corporations had transformed the instrument into
a "sword" or "strategic weapon" that could either defeat the ability of host states to regulate in the public interest or, alternatively, require them to compensate foreign investors
for the costs of regulatory compliance. 8 6
During the same year, Public Citizen and Friends of the Earth released an assessment of
the NAFTA's investment chapter.187 Expressly designed to influence negotiations of investment rules for the FTAA,1 88 that document referred to the then-pending NAFTA in183. See Geflon Schuler, Effective Governance Through Decentralized Soft Implementation: The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1753, 1774 n.105 (2008) (describing the MAI negotiations, in which "NGO opposition took the OECD and the MAI negotiators by surprise and forced the
supporting governments to drop out of the negotiations"): See also Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 869 (2003)
(opining that the MAI "was scuttled, in part by a flood of NGO opposition").
184. In some respects, concerns about early NAFTA Chapter 11 claims seem to have fuelled NGO opposition to the MAI. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 55 (observing that "MAI negotiations
were commenced at the same time that several NAFTA investment claims attained a high public profile," and opining that this contributed to abandonment of the MAI); Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 275, 299 (2000) (noting that NGOs "forcefully opposed the [MAI's] provisions in light of the
increasing number of NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges brought by U.S. businesses with respect to Canada's environmental regulations under the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism"); Jilrgen
Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J.INT'L ECON. L.713, 769 (2002) (describing how Canada's settlement of the Ethyl Corp. claim under NAFTA Chapter 11 reinforced NGO opposition to the
MAI); Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 35 N.C. J.INT'L L.&
COM. REG. 33, 68 (2009) (asserting that NGO "opposition to the MAI ... started largely in Canada after

the Ethyl Corporation dispute under NAFTA").
185. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES: BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY 5 (2001)
[hereinafter BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY], available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.pdf

(predicting that the FTAA "would spread NAFTA's rules to an additional 31 Latin American and Caribbean nations"). See also PRIVATE RIGHTS, supra note 164, at 2 (explaining that the authors-two
NGOs-sought to ensure that negotiators would not repeat the NAFTA's "mistakes" when adopting
investment rules for the FTAA).

186. See PRIVATE RIGHTS, supra note 164, at 1, 16, 33-34.
187. See generally BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 185.
188. See id. (adopting the subtitle "Lessons for Fast Track and the Free Trade Area of the Americas").
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vestment claims as an "extraordinary attack on normal government activity."' 8 9 According
to Public Citizen, foreign investors were using the NAFTA "to demand payment for any
government action that impacts the value of [their] property."19 0 As a result, it predicted
that taxpayers faced "billions" of dollars in liability.191 Given those stakes, Public Citizen
warned that foreign investors could "bully" host states and, thus, prevent them from adopting measures designed to protect the public interest.192
Although the anti-globalist perspective represents standard fare among certain advocacy groups, it quickly and surprisingly found resonance in mainstream news outlets. Thus,
in a 2001 article, the New York Times reported that secret tribunals operating under the
NAFTA's Chapter 11 had already allowed foreign investors to revoke national laws, question the justice systems of host states, and challenge regulations.193 Furthermore, the journalist warned that "the clash between investor rights and public policy" could "grow [even]
more intense."194
During a PBS television broadcast aired in 2002, respected journalist Bill Moyers declared that multinational corporations were using the NAFTA's investment chapter to
"challenge democracy."19s According to Moyers, that phenomenon included "attack[s]" on
"public laws that protect our health-and our environment," as well as "the American judicial system."196 In deciding those matters, secret tribunals could "force taxpayers to pay billions of dollars" or, possibly, compel "radical changes in public policy."197 In a grim assessment, Moyers described the situation as an "end-run around the Constitution."198
Despite the passage of time and the limited success of foreign investors in securing ninedigit awards, 9 9 anti-globalist critiques of investment treaties continue to surface with
some regularity in mainstream newspapers. For example, in 2004, the New York Times
published an editorial that described investment treaty arbitration as a "one-sided
[process] favoring well-heeled corporations over poor countries."2 00 Furthermore, according to the newspaper, "secret trade courts" could award compensation to foreign investors
harmed by government measures required to protect public health, safeguard the environment, or prevent economic collapse. 201 As a result, their decisions could discourage
states from regulating, and could even encourage foreign investors to regard investment

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at ii.
Id. at iv.
Id. at vi.
Id. at vii.
Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Little Secret, Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at 31, available at 2001 WLNR 3421720.
194. Id.

195. Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy (PBS television broadcast Feb. 5, 2002), transcript available
at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript-tdfull.html.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected
Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L.1381, 1400-01 (2003); Franck, supra note 180,
at 49, 60; Barton Legum, Lessons Learned from the NAFTA: The New Generation of U.S. Investment
Treaty Arbitration Provisions, 19 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INv. L.J. 344, 346-47 (2004).
200. The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A26, available at 2004 WLNR 5604717.
201. Id.
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treaties as insurance policies against the normal "risks of doing business." 202
In addition to voicing their own concerns, newspapers have provided a forum for certain academics to reinforce anti-globalist perspectives on investment treaties. Thus, in November 2007, the Financial Times published a letter in which a Harvard business professor
described investment treaty arbitration as an expensive, unpredictable and unbalanced
process that reflects the unequal bargaining power of developed and developing states.203
Likewise, in February 2010, the Guardian published an opinion piece in which a Boston
University professor of international relations claimed that investment treaties "enable
private firms to circumvent environmental laws and then parachute away with large sums
of government money." 204 In addition to demanding that firms "stop panning for gold" in
investment treaty arbitration, he called on the Obama administration to change U.S. investment treaty practice as needed to "[s]top private firms [from] exploiting poor
states." 205
Turning from journalism to the academy as such, some of the nation's most distinguished and influential scholars have expressed anti-globalist themes in their assessments
of investment treaties. For example, Professor Joseph Stiglitz (a Nobel laureate, former
chair of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and former chief economist at the
World Bank) 206 has publicly criticized investment treaties as "one-sided" and "unbalanced"
arrangements that "have undermined democratic processes" and "inhibit[ed] legitimate
207
government efforts" to regulate in the environmental, health, and employment contexts.
Likewise, Professor John Ruggie (an influential political scientist from Harvard, former
Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, and current Special Representative of
the Secretary General for Business and Human Rights) 2 0 8 has expressed sharp criticism of
investment treaties in official reports to the United Nations Human Rights Council. At the
outset of his 2008 report, Professor Ruggie sought to focus attention on "governance gaps
created by globalization," which can "permit corporate-related human rights harm to occur
even where none may be intended." 209 As an example of "imbalances between firms and
202. Id.
203. Wells, supra note 181, at 12.
204. Kevin Gallagher, Stop Private Firms Exploiting Poor States, GUARDIAN, Feb. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/feb/05/el-salvador-gold-pacific-rim-

mining.
205. Id. Substantively, Professor Gallagher recommended changes that would afford host states greater
flexibility to regulate. Procedurally, he recommended a shift from investor-state to inter-state arbitra-

206.
207.
208.
209.

tion (in which context investors' home states must decide whether to espouse claims against host
states), or at least the imposition of a requirement that foreign investors exhaust local remedies before commencing investment treaty claims.
COLUMBIA,
Vitae,
E.
Stiglitz-Curriculum
Joseph
See
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/StiglitzCV.pdf (last visited October 24,
2010) [hereinafter Stiglitz CV].
Stiglitz, supra note 44, at 11, 58; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards
Principlesof Cross-BorderLegal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights With Responsibilities, 23 AM. U.INT'L L.REv. 451, 468, 554 (2008).
See Curriculum Vitae for John G. Ruggie, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/johnruggie/bio.html.
U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Protect,Respect and Remedy: A Frameworkfor
Business and Human Rights: Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalon the Issue of
Human Rights and TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises, 1 11, delivered to the
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie).
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States that may be detrimental to human rights," he cited the "more than 2,500 bilateral
investment treaties currently in effect":
While providing legitimate protection to foreign investors, these treaties also permit those investors
to take host States to binding arbitration, including for alleged damages resulting from implementation of legislation to improve domestic social and environmental standards-even when the legislation applies uniformly to all businesses, foreign and domestic. 210

Later, in a section on "policy alignment," Ruggie described the problem of "horizontal"
policy incoherence, defined as the situation where various departments within a single
government, "such as trade, investment promotion, development, [and] foreign affairswork at cross purposes with the State's human rights obligations and the agencies charged
with implementing them." 211As an example of this phenomenon, he again cited investment
treaties:
They promise to treat investors fairly, equitably, and without discrimination, and to make no unilateral changes to investment conditions. But investor protections have expanded with little regard to
States' duties to protect [human rights], skewing the balance between the two. Consequently host
states can find it difficult to strengthen domestic social and environmental standards, including
those related to human rights, without fear of foreign investor challenge, which can take place under
binding international arbitration.
This imbalance creates potential difficulties for all types of countries. . . . During the investment's
lifetime, even social and environmental regulatory changes that are applied equally to domestic
companies can be challenged by foreign investors claiming exemption or compensation.
The imbalance is particularly problematic for developing countries[;] ... it is precisely in developing
countries that regulatory development may be most needed.212
In his 2009 and 2010 reports, Professor Ruggie reiterated similar concerns about the

negative effects of investment treaties on the regulatory capacities of host states:
[R]ecent experience suggests that some treaty guarantees and contract provisions may unduly constrain the host Government's ability to achieve its legitimate policy objectives, including its international human rights obligations. That is because under threat of binding international arbitration, a
foreign investor may be able to insulate its business venture from new laws and regulations, or seek
213
compensation from the Government for the cost of compliance.
There is a saying that the first thing to do when you are stuck in a deep hole is to stop digging. Yet
countries unwittingly get stuck in metaphorical holes that may constrain their ability to adopt legitimate policy reforms, including for human rights. The prime examples the Special Representative
has studied in depth ... are bilateral investment treaties (BITs) ....

A current BIT case illustrates the problem. European investors have sued South Africa... contending
that certain provisions of the Black Economic Empowerment Act amount to expropriation, for which
the investors claim compensation. A policy review examined why the Government had agreed to
such BIT provisions in the first place. It explains that, among other reasons, "the Executive had not
been fully apprised of all the possible consequences of BITs."
210.
211.
212.
213.

ld. 12.
Id 33.
Id. IT 34-36.
U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the "Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework: Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalon the Issue of Human Rights and TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises, T 30, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (April 22, 2009).
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In conclusion, one important step for States in fulfilling their duty to protect against corporaterelated human rights abuses is to avoid unduly and unwittingly constraining their human rights pol214
icy freedom when they pursue other policy objectives.

Viewed from this perspective, one might draw on human rights narratives not to reinforce the freedoms granted to foreign investors, but to (1) expose the potentially dangerous consequences of their operations, and (2) strengthen the capacity of host states to protect local populations from harm. In fact, this hypothesis mirrors two lines of cases in
which tribunals have invoked human rights principles either to invite scrutiny of foreign
investments or to limit international scrutiny of host-state actions to protect local interests. Thus, in a series of investment disputes involving the operation of privatized water
distribution and sewage services in metropolitan areas, tribunals have accepted amicus curiae submissions from organizations seeking to emphasize the controversies' implications
for human rights, including the right of access to potable water.215 Likewise, while not uniformly embraced, at least one investment treaty tribunal has drawn on human rights doctrine for the proposition that host states deserve a "margin of appreciation" when adopting
measures to uphold public order or to protect essential security interests during periods of
grave economic crisis. 216 In other words, while foreign investors can invoke human rights
narratives to validate the wide zones of autonomy granted to them under investment treaties, skeptics can turn the tables by invoking human rights narratives to protect host states
and their citizens against the dangers posed by the operations of foreign investors. 217
Coming full circle, the narrative for corporations as plaintiffs under international law
might come to resemble the narrative for corporations as defendants under international
law. According to that view, when granted too much autonomy, foreign investors may conduct their operations in ways that pose serious threats to the environment, the safety of
workers, and protection of human rights in host states. Worse yet, instead of providing a
means to redress some of those dangers (as the Alien Tort Statute arguably does), investment treaties establish a legal environment that permits foreign investors to undertake
harmful activities, to avoid discipline, and to demand compensation when host states alter
214. U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the "Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework: Rep, of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalof the U.N. on Human Rights and TransnationalCorporationsand
other Business Enterprises, 71 20-21, 25, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/27 (Apr.9, 2010) (by John Ruggie).
14, 20, 52,
215. Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5,
64 (Feb. 2, 2007), 2007 WL 1215069. See also Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/17, Order in Response to Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae, 7 18 (Mar. 17,
2006), available at http://ita.aw.uvic.ca/documents/Aguas-Amici-17March2006.pdf; Aguas Argentinas S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 1 19 (May 19, 2005), 2005 WL 1458630.
216. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 1 181, 187 (Sept 5, 2008), 2008
WL 5783990. But see Siemens Award, supra note 53, 7 354 (observing that "Article I of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights permits a margin of appreciation not found in
customary international law or the [relevant BIT].").
217. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 108 (observing that human rights principles have been
invoked more often "by respondent states to justify the measures complained of, and thus as defences
against liability" under the relevant investment treaties).
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the rules of the game. In other words, investment treaties transform international law from
a source of hope into an instrument of harm.
Given the strength and resilience of concerns expressed not just by advocacy groups,
but also by influential journalists, leading academics, and distinguished figures in intergovernmental organizations, one must give serious consideration to the anti-globalist narrative about investment treaties. However, one must also consider the extent to which antagonists exaggerate the potentially dangerous qualities of investment treaties. In fact, one
might more appropriately emphasize their weakness and mutability.
With respect to the weakness of investment treaties, one should observe that the resistance of NGOs, developing states, and other opponents has foiled serious efforts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Trade Organization,
and the states of the Americas to conclude a comprehensive multilateral agreement on foreign investment during the last fifteen years, 218 just as all similar efforts have failed for the
last eight decades.2 19 In other words, a truly global or comprehensive regional system for
the protection of foreign investment does not exist and its prospects seem dim. 220 Viewed
from this perspective at least, it becomes hard to accept descriptions of investment treaties
as ominous and growing threats.
Moving from the multilateral to the bilateral context, states have concluded an impressive stock of more than 2600 BITs. 221 However, the limited scope, bilateral character and
textual ambiguity of those instruments leave broad avenues for states to retreat from
commitments thought to produce socially undesirable results. To illustrate the mutable
character of bilateral treaties, one may begin by recalling the obvious fact that (unlike human rights treaties) none of their undertakings rise to the level of jus cogens. 222 Thus, they
lend themselves to periodic renegotiation and updating according to models that currently
emphasize substantial reductions of the autonomy granted to foreign investors and a cor218. See Brower,supra note 34, at 348-49.
219. See Patrick Julliard, Variation in the Substantive Provisionsand Interpretation of InternationalInvestment Agreements, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 76, at 81,

103 (observing that there "have been a number of attempts at drafting a multilateral treaty, and none

of them has been successful"). In 1929, the League of Nations and the International Chamber of
Commerce proposed a Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners. VAN HARTEN, supra note 39,
at 19; A.A. Fatouros, An InternationalCode to ProtectPrivate Investment-Proposalsand Perspectives,
14 U.TORONTO L.J. 77, 79 (1961); Arthur K. Kuhn, The InternationalConference on the Treatment of Foreigners, 24 AM. J.INT'L L.570, 570-73 (1930). After World War II,discussion of an international investment code resurfaced within the framework of negotiations relating to the proposed International Trade Organization. McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 218; SORNARAJAH,supra note 163, at 87; VAN
HARTEN, supra note 39, at 19-20; Fatouros, supra, at 79-81. In 1959, a group of capital exporting
states promoted the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad. SORNARAjAH, supra note
163, at 87-88; VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 20-21; Fatouros, supra, at 79-81. In 1967, the OECD
floated a Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38,
at 18-19; VAN HARTEN, supra note 39, at 21. All of these efforts failed.
220. See Thomas W. Walde, Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation and Investment Disputes:
Competition and Choice as the Path to Quality and Legitimacy, 1 Y.B. INT'L INV. L. & POL'Y 505, 518
(2009) (opining that "it is quite unlikely that within the foreseeable future

...

a unified ... system ...

would emerge" because "[a]ll prior efforts ... have conspicuously failed").
221. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 40, at 468 n.14; Muchlinski, supra note 67, at 36; Salacuse, supra note
63, at 428.
222. See Brower, supra note 66, at 369 n.110, 372 (identifying categories of jus cogens norms and opining
that they have little relevance for the vast run of investment treaty disputes).
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responding reinforcement of the capacity of host states to protect health, safety, and the
environment. 223 While renegotiations have not been frequent in the past, they have occurred. For example, from 1998 to 2008, states renegotiated a total of 132 BITs. 224 With
"numerous" renegotiations in progress, one may anticipate an acceleration of this trend. 225
Although there may have been a time when capital-exporting states would have resisted such trends, 2 26 their leadership in the rebalancing of model treaties indicates that
they might accept the renegotiation of treaties already in force. 227 Even if they do not, denunciation of bilateral treaties remains a possibility now openly discussed and occasionally
used by states eager to change the rules of the game. 228 While observers correctly note that
denunciation may not provide host states with immediate relief because many BITs include clauses that extend protection for several years following denunciation, 229 the fact is
that a credible threatof denunciation can prompt investment treaty tribunals to adopt rulings better suited to the interests of host states. 230
This leads to what may be the most salient point of all: BITs tend to articulate standards
223. See supra notes 80-107 and accompanying text
224. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], Recent Developments in International Investment
at
available
(2009),
6
HA
MONITOR
3
2009),
(2008-June
Agreements
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf.
225. Id. Perhaps of greater concern should be the growing number of investment chapters contained in
bilateral or regional free trade agreements. Unlike stand-alone investment treaties, these instruments
place the treatment of foreign investment into a larger package that includes disciplines on trade in
goods, trade in services, intellectual property, government procurement, and technical standards, as
well as annexes that set forth a range of carefully negotiated exceptions. See Muchlinski, supra note
67, at 36-37. In this context, the revision of investment disciplines even by like-minded states becomes unappealing, as it opens up the entire package for renegotiation. See BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY,
supra note 185, at 38 (quoting then Mexican President Vicente Fox for the proposition that "we are
not in favor of opening up clauses of the free trade treaty, because if we open one, then we would
have to open many"); PRIVATE RIGHTs, supra note 164, at 49 (observing that "suggestions that NAFTA's
text be reopened have met with strong resistance from governments who fear the potential for a
wholesale renegotiation").
Likewise, denunciation of investment obligations becomes unrealistic because states cannot withdraw from them without sacrificing interlocking compromises on trade in goods, trade in services, intellectual property, government procurement, and technical standards. See Charles H. Brower, II,
Hard Reset vs. Soft Reset: Recalibration of Investment Disciplines Under Free Trade Agreements, KLUWER
ARBITRATION BLOG (Dec. 16, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/12/16/hard-resetvs-soft-reset-recalibration-of-investment-disciplines-under-free-trade-agreements. Furthermore, to
the extent that free trade agreements cover relations among three or more states parties, the potential costs of renegotiation or denunciation grow accordingly. Id. Thus, despite perceived flaws, the
text of NAFTA's investment chapter has remained stable, and the states parties will likely remain unreceptive to any textual "rebalancing" or "recalibration" of their obligations. Id.
226. But see UNCTAD, Recent Developments in InternationalInvestmentAgreements (2007-June 2008), 2 IIA
(obMONITOR 5, fig.2 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia2008len.pdf
serving that Germany has engaged in the largest number of successful BIT renegotiations).
227. See id. (predicting a rise in the number of BIT renegotiations because "a growing number of BITs are
nearing expiry of their initial period of validity, and more countries are revising their model BITs to
reflect new concerns related to environmental and social issues, including the host country's right to
regulate").
228. See Salacuse,supra note 63, at 469-70 (discussing Venezuela's denunciation of its BIT with the Netherlands, Ecuador's denunciation of nine BITs, and Russia's decision to terminate provisional application of the Energy Charter Treaty).
229. See id at 472-73.
230. See Loewen Award, supra note 62, at [[ 241-42 (recognizing that the claimant had been subjected to
a "miscarriage of justice," but declining to "put it right," in part because an eagerness to rule against
the United States on a monumental claim could damage "the viability of NAFTA itself').
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of treatment that, at such high levels of generality, grant tribunals a wide latitude to define
(and redefine) the obligations of host states,2 31 a possibility that is reinforced by the absence of any formal system of precedent for investment treaty arbitration. 232 As described
above, many tribunals have shown little reluctance in issuing awards likely to serve the
preferences (and thus to maintain the confidence) of host states. 233 In other words, investment treaty tribunals themselves can play an important role in the rebalancing of obligations through adjudication. While the ad hoc nature of investment treaty arbitration does
not guarantee the perpetuation of this trend, the present trajectory of jurisprudence casts
substantial doubt on assertions that investment treaties empower multinational corporations to inflict harm, frustrate democracy, or undermine the capacity of host states to protect the welfare of citizens.

V. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has sought to examine the limits of three narratives frequently
used to describe the function of, and thus to guide the application of, investment treaties.
First, while the business planning narrative emphasizes the role of dispute-settlement provisions in promoting certainty for international commercial transactions between private
parties, the fact remains that states do not negotiate investment treaties with private parties, that states pursue a variety of goals in treaty practice, and that investment treaties
consequently do not emphasize certainty to the same extent as contracts. Second, while the
human rights narrative emphasizes the capacity of investment treaties to protect foreign
investors from serious abuse by host states, one quickly discovers that claimants under
human rights treaties and claimants under investment treaties occupy fundamentally different positions. Whereas human rights claimants represent relatively powerless individuals with limited access to weak enforcement mechanisms that result in modest awards of
damages at best, investment treaty claimants often possess substantial resources, as well
as direct access to robust enforcement mechanisms capable of producing awards that can
strain national treasuries. Third, while the anti-globalist narrative emphasizes the capacity
of investment treaties to liberate foreign investors (and to restrict host states) in ways that
may undermine the public interest, it often ignores the existence of formal and informal
avenues to facilitate the recalibration of treaty obligations and, thus, create opportunities
to pursue more socially desirable results.
Having tested the limits of three narratives, one feels the temptation to close with an
analogy that better captures the functions of investment treaties. Indulging that desire, one
might compare investment treaties to health insurance plans that provide a measure of
protection when traveling "out-of-network," but do not seem particularly generous and
leave beneficiaries exposed to serious risks. However, the point is that analogies never capture the full picture and, thus, tend to obscure nuance. Under these circumstances, it seems
231. See Brower,supra note 66, at 355-56, 365-66; Salacuse, supra note 63, at 452-53.
232. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 36; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 33, at 102-03; Salacuse, supra note 63, at 460; Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 1188, 1191.

233. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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wiser to draw conclusions based on an overall assessment of the lessons to be drawn from
the foregoing narratives.
Taken together, the three narratives suggest that foreign investors need and should receive a measure of protection against political risks in their host states. Although investment treaties have a role to play in providing the necessary assurances, they do not guarantee the success of investments, protect against disappointment, or require host states to
satisfy best practices in the conduct of public affairs. To the contrary, they provide recourse against serious abuse by government officials in host states, though that leaves
open the question as to exactly what constitutes "serious abuse" in the twenty-first century, 234 and whether the concept might vary depending on the particular characteristics of
the investor or the host state. 235 While recognizing that foreign investors deserve effective
protection from serious abuse, one must not lose sight of the fact that their economic resources and political leverage often rival those of their host states. Because investment
treaties add direct access to an international dispute settlement process that can produce
nine-digit awards capable of enforcement worldwide, they represent powerful tools that
may be applied in useful or pernicious ways. While that justifies public discussion and
monitoring of investment treaty practice, one should recall that investment treaties have a
second characteristic: a mutability that facilitates the adjustments needed to achieve socially desirable results.
In other words, the ebb and flow of practice suggests that investment treaties lie on a
path traversing the territory among competing paradigms. Although the meandering track
may represent a source of confusion at times, one hopes that it embodies a middle path
that draws on the best of human experience, instead of the limited insights afforded by exaggeration and categorical views.
234. See Glamis Award, supra note 77, 22.
The Tribunal further finds that although the standard for finding a breach of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment therefore remains as stringent as it was [in 1926] under
Neer it is entirely possible that, as an international community, we may be shocked by State actions
now that did not offend us previously.
Id.
235. See Generation Ukr., Inc. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 20.37 (Sept. 16, 2003), 2003 WL
24065652 (emphasizing the need to "consider the vicissitudes of the economy of the state that is host
to the investment in determining the investor's legitimate expectations, the protection of which is a
major concern of the minimum standards of treatment contained in bilateral investment treaties"). As
stated by another tribunal:
In 1998, at the time of the Agreement, the political environment in Lithuania was characteristic of a
country in transition from its past being part of the Soviet Union to candidate for the European Union membership. Thus, legislative changes, far from being unpredictable, were in fact to be regarded
as likely. As any businessman would, the Claimant was aware of the risk that changes of laws would
probably occur after the conclusion of the Agreement. The circumstances surrounding the decision
to invest in Lithuania were certainly not an indication of stability of the legal environment. Therefore, in such a situation, no expectation that the laws would remain unchanged was legitimate.
335. But see GlamisAward, supra note 77, 7 615.
The customary international law minimum standard of treatment is just that, a minimum standard.
It is meant to serve as a floor, an absolute bottom, below which conduct is not accepted by the international community. Although the circumstances of the case are of course relevant, the standard
is not meant to vary from state to state or investor to investor.

ParkeringsAward,supra note 41,

Id
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